Colombo Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Research (CJMR), a refereed publication that publish articles, reviews and scholarly comments relating to any field of studies. The journal is a multi-Disciplinary, innovative and international in its approach. It includes theoretical and conceptual articles as well as more empirical studies covering both historical and contemporary issues/events. CJMR is published by the Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Colombo from 2014.

# Colombo Journal of Multi-Disciplinary Research

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# Migration in Sri Lanka: To be recognized as a key enabler for development

**Senior Professor Lakshman Dissanayake**

Vice Chancellor, University of Colombo

## Linking migration to sustainable development

Migration is recognized as an important component of population change. Migration is currently built-in to the global development framework, recognizing well-managed migration's integral role in and immense contribution to sustainable development. The Sustainable Development Goals stimulate policy planning and implementation across countries, identifying the interrelationships between migration and development and the vital contributions of migrants[1]. Migration provides a driving force for sustainable development through the effects of globalization. It decreases unemployment and enrich human capital. International migration has come to play a central role in the social, economic, and demographic dynamics of both immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving countries. With the increasing migration trends, governments, non-governmental sector and private sector increasingly appreciate the relevance of migration to all aspects of sustainable development. Migration is normally recognized as a process which provides benefits to both sending and receiving areas. At the same time, it can also provide trade-offs and costs to migrants themselves, their families and societies. Furthermore, it also can create inequalities and vulnerabilities, particularly when access to regular migration opportunities is not open to everyone and when migration is forced to transpire in disastrous situations. In this context, it is particularly essential to protect, respect migrants' human rights because migrants, especially women who are low-skilled and those who are recognized as forced migrants are missed out from most of the national development policies.

During the recent past, international and internal migration has gradually been accepted as a constructive force for development, because migrants tend to transfer knowledge and

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[1] http://unofficeny.iom.int/2030-agenda-sustainable-development

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skills to both receiving and origin locations, improve investments and remittances, and promote economic linkages and business opportunities between countries and regions[2]. Sensibly accomplished migration can stimulate economic growth and innovation in destination locations, and poverty reduction in origin settings. Simultaneously, to some extent, migration can offset labour surpluses in sending countries, as well as receiving countries can manage their deficient labour markets. Connecting the opportunities that migration provides to sustainable development requires countries to create policy and related legal backgrounds that identify the patterns and drivers of migration, as well as the characteristics of migrants themselves.

It is quite important to note that migration has been explicitly incorporated into the SDGs with the adoption of the 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development Goals[3]:

- ❖ Respect the human rights for all migrants, regardless of their migration status
- ❖ Take into account the vulnerabilities of migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons
- ❖ Recognize the contribution of migration for global sustainable development
- ❖ Address forced displacement and humanitarian crises
- ❖ Promote international cooperation
- ❖ Strengthen the resilience of host communities
- ❖ Support the right of citizens to return to their country of origin

**Internal Migration: Largely neglected aspect**

*Patterns:* Internal migration has been playing a major role in redistributing the population in Sri Lanka stemming from the introduction of colonization schemes during the immediate post-independence period. The redistribution has taken place with the development and expansion of towns both as commercial and administrative centers that attracted large numbers of people to urban areas because of village expansion through colonization or land development schemes which shifted people away from the densely

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[2] https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/544brief15.pdf
[3] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/Migration PopFacts20155.pdf

populated districts of the country (International Organization of Migration, 2005). Besides, migratory movements also have occurred from the northern and eastern provinces of the country to other areas due to the civil disturbances that prevailed for three decades since the 1980s. Figure 1 shows the incessant consequence of colonization schemes by having a larger migration streams for dry-zone districts. Displacement and resettlement of the displaced people have led to upsurge in-migration especially in Vauniya, Mullaitivue and Killinochchi districts.



**Figure 1: Percentage of lifetime migrants, Sri Lanka, 2012**

Source: Author's calculations using data obtained from Department of Census and Statistics

*Marriage and Employment: Key drivers for migration:* Many rapidly expanding Asian economies have observed increases in the rate of internal migration over the past two decades, because of declining job opportunities in rural areas and increased opportunities in urban areas (ODI, 2006). This can be true for Sri Lanka as well since the country moved from lower income status to middle-income country standing during the last decade. Dramatic improvements in communication and transport have allowed for significant levels of large-scale internal movement in Asian countries including Sri Lanka. Many factors driving this migration are common to both permanent and circular migration, including regional inequality, under-employment in rural areas and the growth

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of labour intensive industries such as those established in free-trade zones in Sri Lanka where many girls migrated from rural areas to find employment. Sri Lankan internal migration pattern observed in 2012 census shows that second highest reason for migration is employment (19.4 percent) and about 32 percent of all migrants have either moved to Colombo district where the country's capital is positioned or Gampaha district, which is an adjoining district to the former where majority of the free-trade zone industries are located. It has also been reported that nearly half of female migrants who moved to the district of Colombo originated from the south-western coastal districts of Kalutara, Galle and Matara and the adjacent district Gampaha. Moreover, migration flows to Colombo from the southwestern coastal belt were already well established since 1946 (International Organization of Migration, 2005). However, it appears that the study of female migration has been neglected in Sri Lanka although women constitute a considerably superior proportion than men in internal migration.

The relationship between income and internal migration seems to be clearly visible as depicted in Figure 2 and the Pearson correlation coefficient[4] of +0.72, which suggests a significant positive association. In other words, it explains that the higher the in-migration, higher the income would be. Furthermore, about 51 percent of the district variation of median income is explained by district variation of in-migration in Sri Lanka. This shows that in-migration significantly contributes to improve the income level of the destination areas. In the absence of nationally representative data exists on internal remittances, the above evidence suggests that migration can reduce poverty, inequality, and contribute to economic growth and development. Although there is growing recognition that migration can play a role in reducing poverty (UN, 2005), detailed research on how migration contributes to development is lacking in Sri Lanka. By looking at the district variation in poverty and in-migration, one can observe that 30 percent of district variation in poverty head count ratio can be explained by the district variation of in-migration in Sri Lanka. Even though in-migration does not reduce poverty directly, remittances may help to sustain rural livelihoods by preventing people from sliding further into poverty because of dependence on a deteriorating agricultural base

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[4] The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is a measure of the strength of the linear relationship between two variables.

**Migration in Sri Lanka: To be recognized as a key enabler for development**

(Overseas Development Institute, 2006). Remittances also can stimulate the land market in the sending areas, increase local wages and the demand for local goods and services, and generally improve the economy (Black et al., 2005).

**Figure 2: Distribution of in-migration and median income by districts, Sri Lanka**

Source: Author's calculations using data obtained from Department of Census and Statistics

Overall, the recent census information on migration shows that 19 percent of population (3,861,787) has migrated to another district from their district of birth. Majority of females migrate due to marriage (43.5 percent) while majority of males migrate for employment (30.6 percent). Reasons for migration are depicted in figure 3. This suggests that internal migration in the country is mainly governed by marriage, and employment.

**Figure 3: Reasons for migration, 2012**



Source: Author's calculations using data obtained from Department of Census and Statistics

## Nexus between internal migration, spatial distribution and development: Dynamism essential for policy makers

Spatial distribution of population and development are exceedingly interconnected, particularly in the context of sustainability. Migration is an essential constituent of the spatial distribution of a population and is likely to continue as a key driver in the coming decades, predominantly as a component of urbanization in developing countries. When the relationship between migration and spatial distribution is explored, the process of urbanization becomes very important because the process of urbanization is an intrinsic dimension of economic and social development and, in consequence, both developed and developing countries are going through the process of shifting from predominantly rural to predominantly urban societies and Sri Lanka is not an exception. With urbanization in Sri Lanka expected to increase from 15 percent in 2001 to 60 percent in 2030, it is highly likely to experience potential environmental side effects if proper urban planning is not in place. However, Sri Lanka is very optimistic about the initiatives taken by the Urban Development Authority which may mitigate some of the negative effects and create a sustainable urban development through innovative locally driven initiatives. Presently, a strong association is discernible between the spatial distribution and in-migration of the

country when district-wise analysis is performed. Figure 4 presents the district-wise population densities and percentage distribution of in-migration. It shows that spatial distribution of population and in-migration are highly related to each other. When this relationship is examined further in statistical terms, it was found that 74 percent of the district variation of spatial distribution of the country is explained by the district variation of in-migration. Moreover, these two components demonstrate Pearson's correlation coefficient of +.86, which shows that in-migration in Sri Lanka significantly contributes to the growth of population density throughout the country.



**Figure 4: Ditrict-wise population densities and in-migration, Sri Lanka, 2012**

Source: Author's calculations using data obtained from Department of Census and Statistics

A proper knowledge on spatial distribution of population and its dynamisms is essential for policy makers to introduce socio-economic and infrastructural oriented policy interventions. The interdisciplinary character and the shifting regional impact of demographic change advocate that it is an appropriate priority for regional policy interventions. Spatial distribution can be looked at from a labour market perspective by linking territorial differentiation in economic activity rates, issues of labour supply and the provisions of skills. Demographic processes can also have important implications for the spatial planning components of regional policy. The provision of social infrastructure

and technical infrastructure are usually a policy competence of regional levels and thus needs to be tailored to respond to the differentiated territorial impact of demographic change. There is a possibility that demographic changes can create tensions amongst different ethnic groups and this can have a territorial dimension where different populations are concentrated in particular areas. Therefore, proper understanding of spatial distribution is an important issue for contemporary regional development policy.

**Natural Disasters and Internal-displacement: Protection is a responsibility**

Sri Lanka has been always into a climatic-affected hazardous situation as it is located in the Indian Ocean by encountering two monsoons. The most common hazards experienced in Sri Lanka were floods mostly arising from monsoonal rain or effects of low pressure systems and droughts due to failure of monsoonal rain. Sri Lanka is also prone to hazards such as landslides, lightning strikes, coastal erosion, epidemics and effects of environmental pollution. The impact of climate change can exert adverse effect on agriculture in Sri Lanka thereby increasing severity of food scarcity. The impacts of climate change such as unusual forest fires, floods, drought, and erratic rainfall have been reported in Sri Lanka which potentially affect the natural ecosystem as well as local livelihoods. Rice is the staple food in Sri Lanka and produced at the top end of the optimum temperature range for cultivation which means that the anticipated increases in temperature can have a deep effect on yields.  Estimates suggests that rice yield could be reduced by approximately 5.9 percent if air temperature increased by $.5^0$ C. Sri Lanka has already experienced $.64^0$ C increase of air temperature during the last 4 decades[5]. Rainfall plays an important role in agriculture as any shortages of excess of rainfall lead to a reduction in yields. A small reduction in rainfall can cause a significant decrease in ground water replenishment with huge implications for intensive, lift-irrigation dependent agricultural production in Sri Lanka's sandy soil regions such as Kalpitiya and Jaffna Peninsula[6]. In the other hand, soil erosion and especially, the loss of productive topsoil is also likely during heavy rainfall events. It has been suggested that mean annual temperature is projected to increase by $1.0\degree C$[7]. Mean rainfall is projected to change by 4

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[5] www.wamis.org/agm/meetings/.../S406-Chandrapala_**Sri**-**Lanka**.pdf
[6] weadapt.org/...base/.../policy-briefing-on-**climate**-**change**-in-**sri**-**lanka**Cached
[7] sdwebx.worldbank.org/.../wb_gfdrr_climate_change_country_profil...

percent with a possible decline compared to historical records, with associated changes in the quantity and spatial distribution of rainfall[8]. It is apparent that climate variability and extreme events across Sri Lanka will increase in the future. Occurrence of floods and droughts during the period 1974-2004 showed a significant increase while floods and droughts have affected more than 10 and 6 million people, respectively.

Severity of landslides also has increased during the recent times especially in the highland regions through a combination of heavy rains, geological changes in the hill country, and deforestation. Landslides are common in the districts of Badulla, NuwaraEliya, Ratnapura, Kegalle, Kalutara, Kandy, and Matale. Sea level rise, storm surges, and coastal erosion are greatest in the west, south-west, and southern coastal belt where about 50 percent of Sri Lanka's population is settled. It has been shown that Sri Lanka is currently experiencing an erosion rate of .30 to .35m per year in 45 to 55 percent of the coastal belt[9]. In addition, cyclones often affect the northern region of the country, especially during the months of November and December. Although there was no such historical evidence of high magnitude cyclones, projected changes offer an increased frequency and magnitude of cyclones and other climate-related disasters. Although the 2004 tsunami was not a climate-related phenomenon, it caused brutal damage in the coastal areas adding to the shocks from storm flows[10].

In 2004, almost two-thirds of the Sri Lankan coast was affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami highlighting the country's susceptibility to low-frequency but high impact dealings. According to the information available on the people affected by natural disasters during the period 1974-2004 is illustrated in figure 5, which clearly identifies floods, drought, storm and landslides as the most common natural disasters in Sri Lanka.

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[8] www.wamis.org/agm/meetings/.../S406-Chandrapala_**Sri**-**Lanka**.pdf
[9] www.wamis.org/agm/meetings/.../S406-Chandrapala_**Sri**-**Lanka**.pdf
[10] sdwebx.worldbank.org/.../wb_gfdrr_climate_change_country_profil...

**Figure 5: People affected by different disasters in Sri Lanka, 1974-2004**

The impacts of droughts, floods, landslides, and cyclones include long-term and economy-wide adverse consequences, widespread crop failure/loss outbreaks of human and animal diseases, dislocation of human population, destruction of property and infrastructure loss to livelihoods, shorter growing season, destruction of sensitive ecosystems and biodiversity. Amplification in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters will have massive socio-economic impacts on urban areas and human settlements. Since 60 percent of Sri Lanka's population is expected to reside in urban settlements by 2030, it is critical to guarantee that such developments are effectively climate-proofed to ensure long term sustainability.

The needs and vulnerabilities of those who were forcibly displaced due to natural disasters are different to those who voluntarily migrate and hence there is a necessity to

have a different policy framework for their protection. This suggests a differentiated policy, which will allow humanitarians and development actors to build on existing laws and response apparatuses and thus strengthening the existing international system to better address specific needs of those affected by natural disasters[11].

## International Migration: Not limited to unskilled labour migration

*A leading emigration nation*: Sri Lanka is one of the contemporary world's major emigration nations.  The United Nations (2013) has shown that there were 1.25 million Sri Lanka-born persons living outside of their country of birth, equivalent to 5.9 percent of the current Sri Lankan resident population. Jayasuriya and McAuliffe (2013, 6-7) showed that migration outflows of Sri Lankans can be categorized into five groups such as Temporary workers (skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled), Skilled settlers, Student migration, Asylum seekers and Tourists, including pilgrimages to Nepal and India. Since several of these flows are temporary or circular, not all are captured in the United Nations' estimates of the numbers of Sri Lanka-born persons resident outside of Sri Lanka.  Contract labour migration of low skilled workers, especially female domestic workers to the Middle East, and a lesser extent, Southeast and East Asia, has increased over the years (Hugo and Dissanayake, 2014).

### Trends and Patterns

*Emigration towards more developed regions:* Sri Lanka can be regarded as one of the significant emigration nations of the world today (Hugo, 2013).  According to the United Nations recent data, there were 0.8 million Sri Lanka-born persons living outside of their country of birth in 2000 but increased to 1.3 million by 2013 (United Nations, 2013). This was a 51 percent increase during the 13 year time period and the increase was substantial for the more developed regions as it was 158.3 percent whereas the less developed regions recorded only a 2.7 percentage change. This suggests that the emigration was dominant towards more developed regions during the last two decades.

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[11] Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United Nations Publication E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2,1998

This needs a greater attention as this aspect has been neglected when analyzing international migration trends in Sri Lanka.

**Figure 6:Total migrant stock at mid-year from Sri Lanka to world and major development regions, 1990 to 2013**

Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, United Nations, Population Division

(*www.un.org/en/development/desa/.../international-migration/index)*

**Figure 7: Total migrant stock from Sri Lanka to major region of destination, 1990 to 2013**

Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, United Nations, Population Division

(*www.un.org/en/development/desa/.../international-migration/index)*

Further analysis reveals that Sri Lanka's emigration has been dominant towards Northern America, Oceania, Europe and Africa. In the Northern America, it was only Canada and the United States receiving Sri Lankan migrants. In 1993, Canada accounted 61.1 percent of the Sri Lankan total emigration to that region while the United States of America recorded 38.9 percent contribution. In 2013, this was 70 and 30 for Canada and the United States of America, respectively, providing more dominance towards Canada. The emigration flow for Canada was very significant as it was a fivefold increase from 1990 to 2013 whereas the United States showed only threefold growth. A substantial proportion of Tamil migration to Canada was observed because of the 30 year-long war in Sri Lanka. According to the Canadian 2011 census, Tamil population of Canada was 143,000 and become the 16th largest immigrant language group in Canada[12]. Percentage increase in Tamil population from 2006 to 2011 was 21.3 percent and Tamils had the 13th highest immigrant language growth in Canada.

Although all European regions are attracted to Sri Lankan migrants except the Eastern Europe, Northern and Southern European regions show a marked increase during the recent years. Among the Northern European countries, the United Kingdom has been the most attractive destination for the Sri Lankan emigration during the period 1990 to 2013. Sri Lankan emigration to the United Kingdom during these twenty three years has contributed 88.6 percent to the total change observed for the whole Northern European countries. In addition to those who migrated as students and skilled professionals, there has been an influx of Tamil population migrating to the United Kingdom during the war years seeking for refugee and asylum status. Furthermore, Norway, Denmark and Sweden offered asylum to number of Sri Lankan Tamil migrants during the war years.

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[12] http://tamilculture.ca/tamils-by-the-numbers/

**Figure 8: Sri Lankan emigration to Europe, 1990-2013**

Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, United Nations, Population Division
(*www.un.org/en/development/desa/.../international-migration/index)*

The growth of Sri Lankan emigrants to Oceania has been mainly towards Australia by accounting more than 90 percent both in 1990 and 2013. Figure 9 shows that there was a significant increase of the migrants stock of Sri Lankan emigrants in Australia. This was a more than twofold increase with 59,833 more migrants in 2013 from 1993.

**Figure 9: Sri Lankan emigration to Oceania, 1990-2013**

Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, United Nations, Population Division
(*www.un.org/en/development/desa/.../international-migration/index)*

*Emigration to Asia:* Sri Lankan emigration to Asia has been more significant both in 1990 and 2013 with even a slight increase during the latter year. Although the percentage change of emigration to Asian countries has been very low, it records the highest volume of migration. Amongst the Asian countries, Southern and West Asian regions have been the most attractive destination for Sri Lankan migrants. Sri Lankan emigration to Republic of Korea contributed 62.9 percent to the total change of Sri Lankan emigration between 1990 and 2013 to the East Asian countries. This was due to the opening up of employment opportunities for Sri Lankan labour in the Republic of Korea during the recent years.

Southern and Western Asian regions have been very attractive regions for Sri Lankan migrants because those two regions contributed 62.3 percent of the Sri Lankan emigrants to Asia in 2013. Sri Lankan emigration to India has been dominant throughout the history and this was significantly reflected during the conflict time due to large number of Sri Lankan Tamils migrating as refugees to Southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu. However, the decline of the number in India was due to return of some emigrants after the conclusion of the war in 2009.

**Figure 10: Sri Lankan emigration to Southern Asia, 1990-2103**

Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, United Nations, Population Division

(*www.un.org/en/development/desa/.../international-migration/index*)

Western Asia became attractive to Sri Lankans because of the unskilled/semi-skilled labour employment opportunities available in those oil-rich countries in the region. Migration stock has grown by adding 89,972 during the period 1990 to 2103. Figure 7 shows that the largest number of Sri Lankan emigrants resides in Asia. Amongst the Asian region, West Asian region is the most attractive destination. Figure 11 illustrates that Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait are the major countries that attract labour migration.

**Figure 11: Sri Lankan emigration to the West-Asian countries, 1990-2013**



Source: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision, United Nations, Population Division (*www.un.org/en/development/desa/.../international-migration/index*)

***Irregular Migration:*** Boat migration or Irregular Migration Arrivals is not a recent phenomenon which is specifically developed for Australia. Although Australia is presently the preferred destination of these smuggled migrants, Italy was one of the major destinations in the past. Australia has become a very attractive destination to irregular migrants who seek refugee status. Most importantly, in recent years, it was not only Tamils who were involved with boat migration but Sinhalese as well. The number of Sri Lankan irregular migrants reported in Australia would have increased more if the Sri Lankan authorities have not taken preventive actions in Sri Lanka itself before the irregular migrants leave the country or capturing them while in the sea before crossing Sri Lankan border.

**Migration in Sri Lanka: To be recognized as a key enabler for development**

Available literature on factors influencing irregular maritime migration is dominated by the idea that economic motive as the major reason while few studies highlighted that political or protection issues in Sri Lanka has driven Northern Tamils to make such move. The general understanding of the population is that overseas migration can bring prosperity to the family because international migration has uplifted the socio-economic status at family level. This suggests that the idea that 'international migration brings prosperity' has become a norm, especially among the Sri Lankans who are at the lowest socio-economic category. Most importantly, the international labour migration and the boat migration to Italy have made a substantial impact on irregular maritime migration to Australia because of the benefits drawn from unskilled labour. Although some argue that motive of these migrants are political but Hugo and Dissanayake's study (2014) clearly finds the major reason for irregular migration is economic.

Migration has become a strong element in the Sri Lankan culture with the notion that 'overseas migration can bring fortune'. Therefore, Sri Lankans will continue to migrate with legal or illegal means without even knowing where they migrate but to any foreign destination (Hugo and Dissanayake, 2014).

*A major contributor to development*: International migration provides benefits such as the remittances, the income that migrants send home (Taylor, 2006). It has been frequently cited that significant flows of relatively low skilled workers whose productivity and wages are far higher at the destination countries than at home. Development economists argue that migration and the flow of remittances, as well as the experience, skills and knowledge of returning migrants would facilitate sending regions in developing countries in their economic take-off (Penninx 1982, Beijer, 1970; Kapur, 2003; Ratha 2003; World Bank 2006). Massey (1988) argued that once emigration begins it can promote changes in social and economic structures that make extra outmigration more likely.

Linkages between Sri Lanka and its diaspora have become increasingly important. A major dimension of this has been the sending of remittances to Sri Lanka by expatriates overseas on a permanent or temporary basis. Remittances make up 10 percent of the

national GDP. On average, Sri Lanka received around 7.2 billion US Dollars as its foreign labour remittances in 2016[13]. It was also reported that the inflows by way of workers' remittances significantly contribute to finance 85 percent of the trade deficit of the country[14]. Remittance from foreign employment contributes to 36 percent of export earnings. Its share to the GDP is around 7 percent (Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2012).International migration, has thus become a significant and potentially beneficial component of Sri Lanka in its development framework. The increase in the migration of skilled workers, enhancement of the availability of formal channels, with the increased number of bank branches and service offices in the conflict affected provinces, to remit funds to Sri Lanka, repatriation of savings by migrant workers due to uncertain conditions in the major destinations, increase in average wage rate, increased migration to high wage paying countries like Korea and Singapore were regarded as the major factors that assisted this improved performance in workers' remittances.



Figure 10: Migrant's Remittances Inflow, Sri Lanka, 1975 to 2016 (US$ million)

Source: Drawn from http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/21/remittances-to-developing-countries-decline-for-second-consecutive-year

Main drivers for current international migration trend appear to be employment and education. According to 2012 census data, 85 percent have migrated for employment

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[13] http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/pics_n_docs/10_pub/_docs/efr/annual_report/AR2016/English/5_Chapter_01.pdf
[14] http://www.treasury.gov.lk/documents/10181/12870/2014/23cd697c-85b6-4ad6-8ba3-2a007be8b56e?version=1.0

while 7 percent have migrated for educational purpose. The total number emigrated from Sri Lanka on employment abroad amounts to 1.8 million people while 250,000 annually migrate from the island. This consists of 23 percent of the total employment in the country and 21 percent of the labour force.

By recognizing the importance of foreign employment of this nature to the growth of the economy with the reduction of unemployment, the Sri Lankan government has commenced a number of programmes to increase the migration of skilled workers while reducing the unskilled labour migration as country still experiences large outflow of unskilled workers in search of overseas jobs though it has declined to 66 percent. It is also anticipated that to change the composition of the workers' remittances with the government policy to discourage migration of unskilled labour while encouraging semiskilled and skilled labour including professionals to high income economies[15]. In the recent years, labor migration of skilled workers including professionals increased by 12.5 percent whereas the migration of semi-skilled and unskilled workers has decreased by 23.2 percent. It is quite striking to note that the gender balance in the foreign migrants has shifted from the female dominated structure prior to 2007 to male dominated in 2015 by representing 65.6 percent men and 34.4 percent women[16].

After Sri Lanka began to encourage labour migration to the Middle-Eastern countries, international migration gradually built into a 'migration industry'. Although a coherent framework for governing labour migration is in place for Sri Lanka, a substantial proportion of migrants prefer to take up the informal channel to organize their migration. This suggests that the lack of licensed recruitment agencies in some of their district of residence can make those who intend to migrate vulnerable in the hands of unauthorized agents. Sri Lankan international migration has gradually shifted from an individual or family affair to a process which involved a third party to become a business or industry.

**Recommendation 1:** Mainstream migration in a comprehensive and focused manner in policy documents and national development plans. Sri Lanka should view migration as relevant for sustainable, inclusive and equitable growth and development, and should

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[15] http://www.treasury.gov.lk/documents/10181/12870/2015/68f51df3-5465-4805-ab6f-4a024ec672f6?version=1.1
[16] http://www.slbfe.lk/file.php?FID=254

include migration in development and sectoral planning. Migration offers a driving force for sustainable development through the effects of globalization. It reduces unemployment and improves human capital.

**Recommendation 2:** Generate reliable data on migration in order to formulate more effective policy.  Although mobility of Sri Lankan people has grown rapidly, data collection and data quality have not kept pace. Yet reliable, high-quality data is essential for countering misinformation as well as for formulating more effective policy. Measuring migration is challenging because of widespread undocumented movement of people, however. Census and surveys on migration need to adequately capture data on short-term migration and multiple reasons for migration. Encourage researchers to develop district migration profiles, including district-wise mapping of nature, timing, duration and magnitude of migration cycles. Furthermore, increase research on sector-wise contribution of migrants in different industries of the economy, including their contribution to GDP and domestic remittances which are currently lacking and imperative for policy formulation.

**Recommendation 3:** Lessen the harmful effects of internal migration by implementing pro-poor development strategies in backward areas by providing sustainable livelihood opportunities, increased access to social and physical infrastructure and governance institutions in sending areas and crafting prospects for access to credit.

**Recommendation 4:** It is quite important to Sensitize and train policymakers, regarding obstacles in accessing public services for internal migrants. State and non-state sector organizations must consider age- and gender-specific risks and vulnerabilities of children and that increase essential services for mothers, newborns and children at critical life stages. It is imperative to constitute child protection and vigilance committees at local level to track child migration and prevent trafficking.

**Recommendation 5:** Home countries and host countries should take a shared approach to human capital development in the context of temporary international labour migration. It is quite apparent that the age-sex structure changes and labour market transformation driven by international migration in both developing and developed countries will lead to increased demand for migrant labour in the future. In this context, it is essential to

develop programmes that improve the skills of the migrants to suit qualifications demanded by employment opportunities in the labour receiving countries. Constant dialogue has to be carried out between labour-sending and labour-receiving countries to guarantee the quality of the labour, which should integrate skills training within the framework of human capital development. Similarly, such programmes should include mechanisms to meet the personal needs and aspirations of the migrants themselves. This will in turn facilitate to minimize irregular migration flows; secure financial transactions; and improve the health and social welfare of migrants as well as their families.

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# A Study on Reconciliation of Post-War Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka

Menik Wakkumbura[1] and Nirmali Wijegoonawardana[2]

[1]Consultant, Head/ Centre for Language Studies, Sri Lanka Institute of Development Administration.
[2]Senior Lecturer, Dept. of History, University of Colombo.

**Abstract**

Since the end of war in Sri Lanka in 2009, the landscape of the reconciliation process has come under critical debate. In response, the Sri Lankan government efforts in reconciliation and all other types of efforts are seemingly on increase for achieving peace. In this light, the paper critically examines both practice and theoretical development of how "justice" in the reconciliation can impact on "positive peace" as a greater peacebuilding effort evident to be useful in post-war Sri Lanka. It is debated how reconciliation experienced at all societal layers have considered "justice" as a prerequisite for successful outcomes. Therefore, given the empirical evidence, the paper has prioritized how social justice, removal of cultural barriers and consideration on a wider scope of human rights, regarded in "justice" become a core contributory factor of Sri Lanka`s reconciliation. And these attempts lead for structural changes using of different peacebuilding approaches i.e., "national" and "grassroots". However, in Sri Lanka reconciliation has experienced a number of vital challenges. These challenges are the complex nature of the process, broken consensus on "justice" among people, politicized decision-making, policy gaps and many more. While investigating important empirical findings about the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka, the paper critically examines the use of different reconciliation approaches and how far "justice" has been criticized within the implementation. The study has utilized content analysis and a descriptive narrative to examine the research problem. The discussion arrives at a conclusion of using of both national and grassroots peacebuilding approaches and serious emphasis on "justice" would let reconciliation to be closer in achieving "positive peace". The discussion also reveals the complexities of such achievements unless addressed on "trap" conditions i.e., lack of economic reconstruction, social and emotional competencies, trust, healing and forgiveness.

**Key Words**: Reconciliation, Justice, Peacebuilding, Positive Peace, Sri Lanka

**Introduction**

Reconciliation has the capacity to focus on a range of themes, mechanisms and practices that combine to form the thread of the national reconciliation process (Gibson, 2004; Lederach, 1997). In particular, countries which have experienced civil wars and ethnic strives have experienced reconciliation as a process that was particularly challenging. This paper sheds light on how with respect to the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka; "justice" as a prerequisite for the reconciliation process hindered the attempt to achieve "positive peace". In addition, how "justice" was less applied and monitored when implementing different reconciliation efforts in Sri Lanka. "Justice" poses itself as one of the most complex and multifaceted areas not only in terms of normative implication but also as a pragmatic concern for actual peace, thereby contributing to existing literature as well as easing further academic efforts at understanding the dynamics of "justice" in the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka, the paper expanses this discussion.

This paper however, therein lays the paradox of any reconciliation process, which is deciphering at an early stage which approach is most suitable and be most compensating towards achieving "justice" until a form of "positive peace" is achieved. The three prominent terminologies i.e., justice, positive peace and reconciliation are often linked to the natural reconciliation process as either means, or as an end result, according to the authors' argument. The reconciliation process composes of a multitude of models and possesses a multitude of conceptual uses claiming to depart from the ideal model for establishing an agreeable meaning and an ideal model. When opening scholarly overviews about Sri Lanka's reconciliation process during and aftermath of war, the reconciliation process seems to have been detached from the mainstreamed political process and remained unregulated in the country (Uyangoda, 2013). Much of the cause for the failure of the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka was due to politically motivated-ethnic disagreements, prolonged issues relating to ethnic solitudes at a national level, and wide social and economic inequalities (Perera, 2012). In addition to this, there were numerous disagreements regarding democratic legitimization of political and civil institutions, despite the lack of contribution towards a long standing solution. Based on such empirical experiences local and international scholars have offered far-reaching

interpretations to the reconciliation process in the country[i]. They consider reconciliation as a complex process and perceive it as a challenge due to its incompatibility with unplanned policies.

The paper sheds light on a critical debate on how reconciling "justice" becomes an essential matter, and when "justice" is accomplished as a pre-requisite to many focuses the problematic issues in peacebuilding are eliminated. This paper broadens its scope by considering various arguments related to the "grassroots" and "national" approaches of peacebuilding for implementing "justice" in the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. It is impossible to comprehend the rate of success of an actual reconciliation process without reviewing the broader issues at hand and examining them for possible outcomes; which this paper will not focus on.  However, the paper opens a critical debate of understanding how the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka particularly after the war in 2009 has contributed towards "justice" enabling "positive peace"[ii]. In this overall examination, the paper examines post-war Sri Lanka essentially to find "reconciliation" as a fundamental mechanism. However, academic debates have criticized Sri Lanka for being less effective in considering "justice" in the form of transnational justice (Hogland and Orjuela, 2013). These scholars further argue, that "justice" should not only be considered within the field of transitional justice but also as justice in everyday forms of living such as the ability to engage in economic, social and political spheres; also at community and national levels. In this regard, the following section of this paper poses an important premise for an epistemological and ontological examination of Sri Lanka`s reconciliation process in a multidimensional aspect.. The examination is about the deep rooted causes of "justice" achievable through peacebuilding. Hence, this discussion provides a unique analysis to the answer on theoretical debates and unsolved questions related to the challenging nature of "justice" in the reconciliation process of Sri Lanka.

**Research Problem**

The problem in Sri Lanka is emerged within the basic agreement about reconciliation; its process and implementation are being challenged for lasting peace (terminologically called as "positive peace"). In Sri Lanka, on the one hand, reconciliation is viewed as a social process which aims co-existence of ethnic groups and willingness to accept a

common future. On the other hand, reconciliation is a government attempt for transforming institutional and constitutional means for a greater status-quo. However, such attempts seek how people-to-people approach can impact over ethnic and religious harmony, responsible for plurilingualism, social justice in the societal levels have been clearly problematic. The authors view this as a critical issue related to both reconciliation attempts and its main prerequisite known as the "justice" aspect also Sri Lanka`s less willingness for mutual acceptance on national and grassroots peace approaches over a period. With this explanation, the reconciliation process can be questioned with reference to its overall nature, process and implementation. The problem occurs not only in the above areas and its complex scope and remedial actions for peacebuilding, and in the authors view on the need of structural changes not as an end goal but as a mean for achieving relatively effective peace in the society.

**Justice, Positive Peace and Reconciliation**

Reconciliation as one of the most complex and unique mechanisms in peacebuilding, therefore, naturally acquires various definitions i.e., "building of broken relationships" (Tutu, 2007), and "re-establishing harmony of a society in a reciprocal manner" (Fisher, 2001). The psychological aspect of reconciliation can be to: "replace negative attitudes" (Kriesberg, 2014) and the moral approach would be to "recognize the injustice done, by deciding the healing process" (Montiville, 1993). However, according to widely available definitions; reconciliation is equal to the healing process, which encompasses the terms "closure", meaning the prevention of further hostilities and also the term "healing", meaning rehabilitating individuals affected by the war (Galtung, 1996). Also, reconciliation can be considered in two perspectives- one as a "process" and the other as an "outcome". The outcomes are physical, psychological and attitudinal in scope (Van der Merwe 1999; Hirsch, Mackenzie & Sessay 2012). For example, South Africa's reconciliation has clear constitutional and judicial outcomes; furthermore, it has held various processes related to transnational justice, forgiveness through collective and individual amnesty, healing and truth-telling (Tutu, 2007). Reconciliation in Nepal similar to the South African national reconciliation process, established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and various state level formations to recognize war victims. However in Nepal, the TRC has functioned without compensatory obligations

(Adhikari & Hansen, 2013). These pragmatic experiences show how reconciliation as a functional mechanism for healing and truth-seeking establishes differently in post-war societies. Sri Lanka`s national reconciliation process, according to the proposed and National Policy on Reconciliation consists of six (06) vital aspects i.e., equity, human rights, inclusivity and diversity, justice and rule of law, ownership, and clear and constant communication (2016).

World literature shows "justice" in reconciliation, addresses the wrong-doing or responds to the wrong-doing (Schreiter, 2004). Also how accomplishing "justice" during a reconciliation process includes "punitive justice"; meaning the moral responsibility of wrong-doing; moreover the widely accepted transitional justice focuses on "retributive justice" and "restorative justice" meaning that the perpetrators of the act of wrongdoing are proportionately punished and perpetrators are forced to take responsibility for repairing the harm they have caused[iii]. As per the point of view of social justice, reconciliation constitutes a "just" outcome. Literature on this is best explained through "transitional justice" (Cassesse, Tutu, 2009). Antonio Cassesse argues that reconciliation is essential to meeting with national justice processes that adhere to a) collective amnesia and b) general amnesia with regards to perpetrators (1998). He argues how the judiciary process can support reconciliation by accepting and promoting true forgiveness for wrong doing. Also, "justice" serves as a multi-faceted form for healing processes. "Justice" in liberal and economic perspective inclines a "critical" perspective in modern debates, thus associating a boarder social and economic development. This challenges the old school notion of liberal justice by establishing liberal democracies and market economies (Adhikari and Hansen, 2013).

These essential components are explained well in the "continuum of peace" theoretically distinguished by John Galtung's writing titled Violence, Peace and Peace Research (1969). He has profoundly conceptualized how the aspect of "negative peace" is separate from the aspect of "positive peace" and how well justice concerns will be prevailed over violence. Further he explains "positive peace" as a prerequisite for sustainable peace in peacebuilding. The structural developments in peace attainment contain numerous establishments such as relief, rehabilitation and reconciliation (Richmond and Tellidis,

2012). Galtung's model (1969) comes closest to conflict analysis and conflict transformation synthesis. It recognizes the meaning of "conflict" in a broader perspective by understanding the "conflict" in a more specific context. His arguments re-examined by two prominent scholars in the field of conflict resolution, named Edward Azar (cited in Ramsbotham, 2005) and John Burton (1984) reinforced constructive conflict handling through structural and cultural approaches in conflict transformation. These pragmatic applications tend to investigate how far attitudes, contradictions and behaviors are functioning over a conflict and conflict resolution. More specific to the main concern of this paper, is the term "justice", as reconciliation during post- conflict peacebuilding is immersed in cultural and a social condition in which exploitation is minimized and neither overt violence nor the phenomenon of underlying structural violence could be evident. Structural peace developments thus emerge in "positive" upon "negative" peace means. In other words explanation related to the "positive" aspect clearly endorsed "justice" by considering that; establishment of social justice, removal of cultural barriers, self-realization which means much personal choice, meeting basic human needs (rights), economic and social wellbeing and environmental balance are attained. This elaboration restates "justice" as a clear prerequisite for "positive peace" in which reconciliation plays a vital role in peacebuilding.

**Sri Lanka's Reconciliation Process**

Sri Lanka's reconciliation process requires an analysis with a strong understanding of the entire destruction caused by the civil war and the circumstances that caused the civil war to extend for thirty years[iv]. The number of direct and indirect war affected causalities, deaths; property loss, remaining refugees, ex-LTTE combatants and overall psychological and economic loss become an important aspect for critical examination. These aspects either directly or indirectly cause injustice in society. According to statistics released by the Government Census and Statistics Department (2012) an estimate of 6858 people died between January and May 2009, the first five months of 2009. A peak in the number of casualties in Sri Lanka appears in 2009 according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. According to the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordination Office the total number of deaths amount to 80,000-100,000 people during the

years spanning from 1983-2009 (United Nations, 2012). During the same period thousands were internally displaced. The economic consequences as stated by Saman Kelagama (1999) show how war had caused the country to incur an "enormous economic cost" in terms of investment and production cost, not to mention, the psychological damage caused by the war which is incalculable (cited in Rotberg, 1999).

However, considering Sri Lanka's post-war recoveries, significant achievements have been made on economic, social and political terms. Those rehabilitation and reintegration programs during the years between 2009 and 2011 became significant in the process of peacebuilding. The programs related to reintegration showed different national peace approaches used in the country. These rehabilitation programs have focused on victims of war, captured combatants and the perpetrators belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (referred to as "LTTE" hereafter) during Elam war III and Elam war IV. In these programs, the total number of rehabilitees amounted to 12,167 by the year 2013 and those who have been reintegrated total to 11,002 (The Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, Sri Lanka, 2014). In addition to this, the total number of resettlements of conflict induced communities from the Northern and Eastern provinces have been totaled as 232,828 families and 796,342 persons by the end of May 2015 (Ministry of Resettlement, 2015).

While these reconciliation programs have produced a significant number of rehabilitees and resettlements, in 2011 the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (referred to as "LLRC" hereafter) had recommended a legal and political solution for lasting peace. In order to implement these decisions, the government had formed a National Action Plan (NAP) in 2012 to undertake the assignment. Also the drafted National Policy on Reconciliation in 2012 had proposed a multi-ethnic, multi-party and home-grown solution. In addition to this, Sri Lanka's National Policy Framework for Social Integration has been aimed at ethnic co-existence and needful co-relational social engagements between three (03) main ethnic groups in the island[v]. More importantly the Paranagama Commission established in August 2013 and The Paranagama Report[vi] produced in 2015, claimed for an independent judiciary inquiry process for war crimes. This Commission reinstated the LLRC concerns on state actions for crime and missing

persons' issues, and the government to establish a special commission titled "Presidential Commission to Investigate into Complaints Regarding Missing Persons". Moreover, the state institutional and policy establishments since 2015 are multiple to address the question left delayed on reconciliation. Among some of the vital institutional establishments i.e., Office for National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR) in 2016 and draft National Policy on Reconciliation, and ministerial portfolios such as, Ministry of National Integration and Reconciliation, and the Ministry of National Coexistence Dialogue and National Languages. The Secretariat for Coordinating Reconciliation Mechanism attached to the Prime Minister`s Office took over monitoring the Office of Missing Persons, Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Non-Recurrence Commission, Judicial Mechanism and Office of Reparations.

However, the provocative "national" reconciliation in Sri Lanka has largely concentrated on contracted institutional realizations, political (re)formation related to ethnic harmony and territorial-based devolution of power. These mechanisms and institutional forms are taking a prolonged time for finding remedial measures on crucial issues such as land re-settlements, offering basic needs to the those affected by war, and issues on larger social and economic needs; thus leaving an unsolved problem in the country. Critics show many reconciliation attempts as mere political promise rather than a deliberate peacebuilding attempt[vii]. Also, heavy critics over certain major changes concentrated after the war were about economic reconstruction and establishing infrastructural necessities and few market goals in the North and East of Sri Lanka.

Given the emphasis on the critical question of reconciliation, most issues at a community level seem to have not been effective for the healing of victims' grievances and granting necessary human needs for re-establishing their lives. The economic deprivation and low market place opportunities, truth-telling and healing within liberal and social perspectives remain areas that have been considered the least. The anthropological study held by Jayawickreme et.al (2012) stressed that the actual psychological well-being of individuals who have been traumatized during the war has not been tackled (2012;130-135). Not only the psychological concerns but also the economic deprivation in the North and East are wide-spread issues that continue to challenge the reconciliation process (Kelagama,

2013). These fundamental aspects of reconciliation therefore become important for scrutiny. The prevailing experiences bring an empathetic inception for investigating further on the issues at "grassroot" levels. In fact evidence least prioritized, yet are vital aspects of reconciliation over the last seven years, have elevated the trapped nature of the reconciliation process adding multiple angles to the "justice" scope. It is further apparent when reviewing economic and socio-political debates in local literature. The national level economic development programs known as the development of the East "*Neganahira Navodaya"* and development of the North, "*Uthuru Wasanthaya"* in the 180-days plan during 2010-2011 resulted in some major infrastructural developments within the war affected areas (Kelegama & Abayasekera, 2012). The liberalists have showed how the post-war rapid economic growth island-wide, improved Gross Domestic Production by increasing it from a 3.5% in 2009 to a 7.3% in 2013. However, despite the improvement of the economy, unemployment still remained high in the North and East (Central Bank, 2013; Kelegama, 2013). Added to these criticisms, the current political regime has looked for a strategic economic direction for poverty elimination in some of the economically parallelized districts such as Mannar, Mullaitiuv, and Kilinochchi which were the districts worst affected by the war. Arguments portray how the economic factor was one of the core contributory factors; yet how it failed in supporting a sustainable form of peace and failed to aid in post-war recoveries. However, as to scholarly arguments the only significant outcome too was the economic factor that has overlooked sustainable economic development as a foremost establishment to many conflict grievances (Uyangoda, 2013).

Relevance to the emphasis on de-militarization and re-integrating of communities directly combat in the war there have also not been successful attempts for the last six years. Rajasinham-Senanayake used the phrase "mission and mandate creep" to highlight the continuous military presence in the war torn areas (2011). Also, according to Hoglund and Orjuela (2013) those grievances of minorities have not been dealt with, hence there is no transition from a militarized society to a non-militarized society (2013; 307). The LTTE combatants who surrendered and were recorded as 11, 644 individuals in 2009, have been reintegrated to their native societies. Yet, a number of local researches which

examined the DDR[viii] processes have arrived to a grounded conclusion on the unsuccessful and challenging nature of the DDR process and how these repercussions deeply cause issues to actual peace realizations. These arguments show how community development and capacity building of victims and former LTTE combatants have become problematic for individuals in societal transformation aiming for better integration. Also how alterations can be made for the future, on the former LTTE combatants not yet well thought out.

The problem in Sri Lanka emerges within the basic agreement on how difficult issues on "justice" relevant to the reconciliation process, contribute less toward structural changes aimed at "positive peace". If structural changes mean establishment of a wide variety of social justice, removal of cultural barriers, and meeting with human rights, the question in Sri Lanka about successful reconciliation remains highly unattained. These critical issues lead the country to a trapped position as argued by authors. The trap covers with insufficient distribution of social and economic resources, un-attended single issues related to war crimes, missing persons, initiation of truth-telling and healing processes, and aspects related to reparation and transitional justice. Further, the trap will be more stiffed due to poor policy directions. The problem has become worse when reconciliation i.e., "grassroots" and "national" as a whole contributes less towards generating a common consensus over a type of Sri Lankan reconciliation process. These issues thus pertaining to people's levels (victimizer and victim both inclusively) and in the community level widen the problem. In addition, the dual model of Sri Lanka's reconciliation i.e., a social process which aims at co-existence between ethnic groups and the willingness to accept a common future, and reconciliation as an attempt made by the government for transforming institutional and constitutional means for a greater status-quo, is adding multiple means to the local debates. However, such attempts attempt to portray how a people-to-people approach can impact ethnic and religious harmony, responsible for plurilingualism, social harmony; equal rights and equity in greater choices at a societal level become unclear. These aspects cover a large scope of social injustice. The pertaining unequal choices and limited resources for achieving adequate justice at an individual and societal level hinder "positive peace". Else the number of policy

formulation, institutional establishments and related all national consultation processes are less collective for better distribution of resources and implementing decisions through skillful workforce in the line of national aims.

**The Critical Question on "Justice" Pertains**

Among some of the vital scholarly discussions about the usefulness of establishing "liberal peace" and ethnic and social integration shows, how economic development mitigates societal harm. This was the foremost consideration since the end of the war in Sri Lanka thus hiding the trapped outlook of the reconciliation process. Authors such as Sanmugaratnam and Stokke (2008) in their study explain the government's readiness for immediate actions over rehabilitation and resettlement of war victims have never been contributory toward a successful economic development of the North and East (pp. 99-102). Not only the economic issues but also problems within displacement, psychological trauma and psychological wellbeing of those in the North and East since 1980, with the emergence of direct military confrontation have destroyed the wellbeing of the civil society over many decades. These scholarly debates claimed the importance of the social psychological impact of the war to be healed, rebuilding of physical infrastructural damage, targeted mental health services, and ramifications as key factors of a reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. Also national policy literature have identified prominent characteristics specific to the scope and interest of unique reconciliation processes and the question on how "reconciliation" is context specific, challenging and dynamic. Added to many criticisms, the Final Full Report of the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanism (CTF, 2017) explains;

> "… Grave concerns were expressed in the submissions about
> ongoing human rights violations in the North and East, including
> allegations of abductions and incidents of intimidation of victims
> and human rights defenders. The continuation of these incidents is a
> matter of serious concern, having a detrimental impact on the
> credibility of the Transitional Justice process (2017, p.3)".

Having stated that, the Report has examined the poor performance of the overall tasks related to "justice" i.e., disappearances, rights to the victims and survivors, firm and regular investigations (mechanism), resource sharing and awareness and many other

institutional structuring for better implementation of the policy. In addition, criticism show the use of the process of healing and enhancing inter-ethnic harmony and co-existence has to come from within Sri Lanka, its people and its Government (2015). Also how the least understanding about the meaning and use of reconciliation far severely impact the poor performance of "justice" accomplishments. The United Nations in their Report to the Government in 2016 explains "fostering a process of closure and accountability and listening to the views and opinions of the victims and survivors who will prioritize different aspects of transitional justice" (2016, 9-10). It is a question how much deliberately the victims and survivors can contribute with a proper feedback. When assessing these claims reported at a policy level, despite the number of reconciliation attempts that have been made in the country, Sri Lanka is yet to use a right tracked reconciliation process which is crucial. In addition to this, within the role "justice" a space for promoting state legitimization, progressive politics and economic justice become questionable to any grassroots person.

**Conclusion**

The revoked idea of a successful reconciliation in multiple means specially attending to transitional justice concerns, reparations, concerns over human rights and institutional and policy level reformations making a significant improvement in the country. The findings highlight the prolonged nature of the issue(s) pertaining not only to the mere scope of reconciliation but also to the number of questions around "justice"; continuously challenging any successful outcome. The paper shows how Sri Lanka has been less contributory in any successful continuation and with the regime change in 2015 there has been a change in the reconciliation direction from economic to a more social and political context by addressing some of the vital concerns raised by the Human Rights Commission on justice and human rights aspects[ix]. The findings also show some of the worst affected ideological and physical damages being highly influential over successful reconciliation at an individual level. Hence, it would appear that Sri Lanka is at stake when considering progressive reconciliation, the present and future. Also, meeting with human rights concerns, truth-telling and transitional justice have become major tasks that require firm planning and collective institutional and policy level developments. Despite

heavy concentration over economic recoveries until 2015, the country continues with economic attainment a valid proposition as the paper examined. As mentioned in the main discussion the CTF 2017 Report highlights some of the major drawbacks that Sri Lanka immediately should attend to and correct. These well examined policy directions and reporting is on the one hand a guide for future actions. Also the Report convinces the foreign audience - who are very keen about domestic reconciliation and peacebuilding endeavors for being supportive. Sri Lanka as is a small nation, it is essentially important to tie-up with the international system for better performance of reconciliation, so that the "trap" could be removed. In addition, as discussed under several vital themes the people-to-people support and the national-to-people and people-to-national support as per authors preference to be called as "grassroots" and "national" reconciliation become inevitably important for diminishing of unknown statuses of what reconciliation is meant by Sri Lanka. The authors define these situations as virtual and physical "trap" conditions. Given the enormous amount of literature and timely up-dated information, the paper presents the nature of the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka, and how if we are to attain fruitful results the gradual and holistic consideration over "justice" is to be thoroughly maintained so that positive and sustainable peace become realistic in the country.

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[i] See for more details: J. Uyangoda, (2010), explaining how the state reformation after the war in 2009 has focused on less dynamic national reconciliation for greater peace achievements itself has become a challenge for ongoing political stability and sustainable solution to the ethnic question in Sri Lanka.

[ii] See for more details: Galtung`s study on "positive peace" elaborating how violent in the formation of two aspects a) direct violence and b) structural violence forms cause tremendous harm to social justice of a society. The situation becomes more critical in a war tone society by making more structural harm. Therefore according to Galtung, "peace" achievements become challenging yet become important to be focused on elimination of structural injustices and differences.

[iii] See for more details: the work of Robert Schreiter, (2004). Punitive justice in more religious terms explained with reference to Christianity, Judaism and Islamism. In his explanation *punitive/ retributive* justice holds a similar meaning: punishment to "wrong-doing" and *distributive justice* as to achieve universal dignified life, *restorative/ commutative justice* as to give back as much as possible what has taken from them and finally *structural justice* in the establishment of correct social structural order.

[iv] See more details: K.M de Silva (1986), Uyangoda (1999), Hoglund and Orjuela (2013).

[v] The social integration policy of Sri Lanka (2012) after the end of war (1983-2009) declares social-coexistence through various policy implementations. Among them the language policy of Sri Lanka and religious harmony between three main ethnic groups i.e., Sinhala, Tamil and Muslims has become a vital objective. (Annual Report, Ministry of National Languages and Social Integration, 2012).

[vi] See for more details: The Final Report, Paranagama Commission (2017), *" Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Complaints of Abduction and Disappearances"* referring the First

Mandate, (2013), and the Second Mandate, (2014) detailed about the missing persons issues and including of violations to International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law.

[vii] See for more details: Marcellin, S., & Uyangoda, J. (2013). The book explains how political will of the country become a central element to decide on the peacebuilding in Sri Lanka.

[viii] See for more details: J. Goodhand, (2010). On how Sri Lanka as a "fragile state" become interesting in demilitarization and disengagement activities. The proposed "Sri Lankan- model" reflects its own direction for peace yet with heavy involvement through political influences.

[ix] See for more details: UN Human Rights Commission 2016 report

# A Coxian Critical Reflexive Lens as a Methodological Tool for Analysis In Liberal Peacebuilding Research in Sri Lanka

Ramya Chamalie Jirasinghe

Deputy Director of the US-Sri Lanka Fulbright Commission

**Abstract:**

There is an ongoing debate between the neo-positivist researchers who insist that IR research should follow positivist methodologies and the post-positivist researchers in subfields such as feminist and critical studies in IR who insist that the very selection of a methodology is a positioning of power and a validation of a truth through the knowledge the methodology enables. The selection of methodology, the process used to create knowledge, is therefore a decision to position a particular body of knowledge over another. The selection of a particular method over another is an act of enabling a body of knowledge, a truth, and therefore an act of power that can disrupt an entrenched order or destabilize it. This paper explores Coxian critical analysis in IR research and discusses the use of Coxian analysis in exploring the Sri Lankan conflict in a setting of liberal peacebuilding critique. The paper concludes that a critical methodology such as Coxian analysis enables a researcher to question the epistemological and ontological assumptions that have been prevalent in analyzing the Sri Lankan conflict.

**Key Words:** Cox, Liberal, Peacebuilding, Critique, Sri Lanka, Conflict.

**Introduction:**

Theory and methodology are interlinked. A research problem explored from a problem-solving theoretical framework will adopt a positivist methodology, while research that critically engages with its subject will turn to "hermeneutics and *Ideologiekritik"* (Devetak, 2005, p. 145).

Sprinz and Yael (2004, p. 1) identify, case study, quantitative and formal, as the three methodologies that are used in IR research. Where theory provides clear and accurate explanations of phenomena, methodology forms the structured and codified ways to test these theories (Sprinz &Yael, 2004, p. 4). Whatever methodology that is chosen for a research project from the list of three given by Sprinz and Yael (2004), which are case study, quantitative and formal models, the decision to choose a particular methodology needs to be guided by the characteristics of the phenomena the study is trying to examine (Bennett & Elman, 2006).

There is an ongoing debate between the neo-positivist researchers who insist that IR research should follow positivist methodologies and the post-positivist researchers in subfields such as feminist and critical studies in IR who insist that the very selection of a methodology is a positioning of power and a validation of a truth through the knowledge the methodology enables (Aradau & Huysmans, 2013; Geller & Vasques. 2004; Gerring, 2011; Tickner, 2005). The selection of methodology, the process used to create knowledge, is therefore a decision to position a particular body of knowledge over another. As Tickner (2005) points out, the decision to ask questions not commonly asked in IR, required the feminist IR researchers to formulate and amalgamate methodologies, to enable new epistemologies and to review existing ontologies. Methods[1] therefore play performative and political roles (Aradau & Huysmans, 2013, p.3). The selection of a particular method over another is an act of enabling a body of knowledge, a truth, and therefore an act of power that can disrupt an entrenched order or destabilize it.

This paper proceeds as follows. It first discusses the debates around critical methodology in IR research and then outlines Coxian critical theory and Coxian historical analysis. The paper then provides a brief introduction to the contemporary critique of liberal peacebuilding. The paper finally examines the need for critical methodology in peacebuilding research in Sri Lanka.

**Critical Methodology in IR:**

The editors of the 2013 *European Journal of International Relations'* special issue "End of International Relations Theory?", called for an "integrative pluralism" of IR theory (Dunne, Hansen &Wight, 2013). They argue that moving away from the theoretical pluralism versus fragmentation divide, to an integrative pluralism, will allow IR to explore the complex problems and phenomena it deals with in a holistic and multi-faceted manner (Dunne, Hansen & Wight, 2013).  In response, Hamati-Ataya (2013*)* argues that pluralism and integration in IR theory have prevented a genuine critical discourse on the phenomena being explored.  Hamati-Ataya (2013*)* points out that the

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[1] See Jackson (2011) for a discussion on the difference between methodology and method and their implication on IR research.

"critical" focusing is limited to a criticism of the events, arrangements and outcomes, instead of being based on Critical Theory that is reflective of the constructs within which the phenomena are occurring. As Hamati-Ataya (2013) points out:

> A theory that 'criticizes' social reality but excludes the critique of thought, truth, theory, and science as components of that reality is only very minimally 'critical', and of no significant value to any serious reflexive project in IR.
>
> (Hamati-Ataya, 2013)

The fundamental basis of critical IR theory is *"...the idea that the study of international relations should be oriented by an emancipatory politics"* (Devetak, 2005, p. 137). Modern critical theory, which emerged from the Frankfurt School,[2] focuses on the need to understand the challenges faced by people in contemporary society as being a result of a historical trajectory, which could be resolved by understanding the inherent characteristics of the structures that enabled them. This understanding was to be used for dismantling historical structures and systems that subjugated and disempowered people. The other defining characteristic of critical theory is its recognition that knowledge creation, therefore theory, was also a product of society. This meant that critical theory and the theorist, even as they were trying to develop a theory of society, needed to be reflexive of their own parameters (see Devetak, 2005, p. 139; Wiggershaus, 1995, p.542). However, the Frankfurt school theorist did not address the international system in their analyses, yet their theories influenced the critical international theorists such as Robert W. Cox who emerged in the 1980s.

Cox, who pioneered critical international theory, drew from the work of Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School, and differentiated critical theory of the international sphere from traditional (problem solving – in Coxian terms) theory, which is bound by positivist

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[2] The Frankfurt School (Institute of Social Research) was founded in 1923 in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, with a donation from the wealthy son of an industrialist who wanted to see Marxism developed into a radical system, relevant to the times. During the 2nd World War, the school was forced to close down under the Nazi leadership, and it was relocated to the University of Columbia in the USA but returned to Frankfurt in the 1950s. The school had an unprecedented impact on many fields of study such as sociology, psychoanalysis, music, film studies, literature, as well as social (especially violent student) movements and intellectual traditions in its evolution over five decades (see McLaughlin,1999 and Wiggershaus, 1995, for discussions on the evolution of the school, its key thinkers, theories and impact).

methodology and a preference towards legitimizing the prevailing social-political order (Devetak, 2005, p. 141). Cox made a distinction between theory that functions as a guide to solving a particular problem that is being observed, from theory that is reflective of its own perspective in the approach to the problem (Cox, 1981, p. 128). The fundamental difference in the two types of approaches to a problem lies in that the former takes the existing social, institutional and power dynamics as the established boundaries of the problem, while the latter steps aside from these boundaries and questions how those dynamics came into being (Cox, 1981, p. 129). Cox argued that problem solving theory enabled the neo-liberal international system to exist by situating itself in the nexus of the state system, the global economic system and the global ecosystem, and making itself the ideological basis of analysis (Cox, 1992a; Cox, 1992b). Cox views the end of the cold war not as an "end of history" (and the end of the clashes between economic and political systems), but as the beginning of an era when the political and economic orders would be severed from each other, leaving people, especially the marginalized and disadvantaged, feeling alienated in the society they live in (Cox,1992a). To Cox, this is the crisis of democracy in the neo-liberal system:

> Today, a different kind of crisis affects democracies: a disillusionment of people with political leadership, a turning away from politics with a certain disgust, an association of politics with corruption, a sense that politics doesn't really matter except to the politicians, a widespread depoliticization.
> ….
>  It is difficult not to see a correlation between the success of the new capitalism and this effect of depoliticization. By removing the economic sphere from political control--whether this is achieved by law or by ideology--what determines the condition of people in their everyday lives is removed from their control. Politics becomes irrelevant. The sense of civic efficacy is removed; and many people, the most disadvantaged, are left in the futility of alienation. Their rage is unchannelled, ineffective, self-consuming. It marks an impasse. It does not herald the construction of a future.
>
> <div align="right">(Cox, 1992a, p. 8)</div>

It is because of this crisis of democracy, engendered by the neo-liberal global order, and ignored by multilateral institutions in their effort to deal with immediate problems, that critical international theory becomes most pertinent. A new order will need to be built, from the grassroots upwards when the existing order fails and is transformed when it

cannot control the system from top down (Cox, 1992a, p.11). A critical international framework turns the research away from the problem solving discourse of the IC towards one that examines the boundaries and epistemological foundations that theoretically justify that order.

**Coxian Critical Theory:**

The "turn" in IR studies from a positivist, a-historical-problem solving framework, to a post-positivist critical framework has a clearly distinguishable moment: Robert W. Cox's publication of his seminal essay, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in 1981 (see Burchill & Linklater, 2005, p.14; Leysens, 2008, p. 4).[3] Much of the power-based contemporary liberal peace critique is grounded in Coxian critical theory (Chandler, 2011, p. 176).

Problem solving theory, as opposed to critical theory, needs to be understood as arising from a particular historical context, therefore, the manner in which it proposes to solve the problem is constructed from within its context and precludes questioning as to whom the theory serves (Cox in Schouten, 2009, p. 5). The most important aspects of the problem solving theoretical approach is its assumption of the fixity of the dynamics of a setting and that it does not acknowledge its ideological basis, but attempts to solve a problem to ensure that ideological foundation can be perpetuated (Cox, 1981, p. 130). The framework of problem solving theory is value bound, since it does not question the framework within which it exists, despite using the positivist methodology of stabilizing its variables, and is therefore not value free as it claims to be (Cox, 1981, p. 130; Leysens, 2008, p.20). For Cox, the problem solving theoretical basis equalled positivism, which he associated with the neo-realism (Cox, 1981, p. 131; Leysens, 2008, p. 41; Mittelman, 1998, p. 63).

On the other hand, critical theory attempts to be aware of the perspective it takes, and questions the framework from which it explores a situation to draw a holistic account of

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[3] See Mittelman (1998), Devetak (2005) and Leysens (2008) for a discussion on the theoretical developments made by the Frankfurt School, Linklater, Richard Ashley, Foucault, Bourdieu and others, at the time, whose work challenged the standard neorealist and state centric thinking of the cold war.

the dynamics at play (Cox, 1981, p. 129). In critical theory, the initial problem leads to a "contemplation" of the bigger picture of which it is a part and will lead to attempts to explore the manner in which the issue at hand and the larger canvas are dialectically interconnected in a process of change (Cox, 1989, p. 129).  Coxian Critical Theory however, does not ignore the value of problem solving theory and of looking for causal reasons (Leysens, 2008, p. 41; Unay, 2010, p. 42). In exploring a problem such as climate change, Cox points out how problem solving theory will enable the globe to find solutions to the energy crisis and develop renewable sources of energy (Cox in Schouten, 2009, p. 6).   Critical theory, on the other hand, will explore the wider network of factors that are at play, ranging from Western religious thinking that posits nature is a resource created for the service of humans, to Enlightenment-modernist thinking that assumes that nature is a force that can be controlled by humans (Cox in Schouten, 2009, p. 6).   Cox discusses how problem solving can be the springboard for critical analysis:

> With the example of climate change, the question is not to choose between problem-solving or critical theory. Problem solving theory is practical and necessary since it tells us how to proceed *given* certain conditions (for instance, the consequences to be expected from carbon generated from certain forms of behavior in terms of damage to the biosphere). Critical theory broadens the scope of inquiry by analyzing the forces favoring or opposing changing patterns of behavior.
>
>                                              (Cox in Schouten, 2009, p. 6)

As pointed out by Cox, it is useful to begin with the immediate event from a problem-solving basis and then move onto the wider critical frame.

Coxian Critical Theory has two key sets of concepts on structures: "power and production"; and "hegemony[4], state and civil society" (Mittelman, 1998, p. 67; Unay, 2010, p.40). In critical theory the dynamic between the structures is analyzed through a lens called "historicism", to understand the nature of a current event.  Cox points out:

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[4] Cox expanded Gramschi's term, "hegemony" (Forgacs, 2000), into a "neo-Gramscian approach" in IR analysis to incorporate the relationship between the state, the global order and civilians (see Unay, 2010 for an analysis of the World Bank using a Coxian neo-Gramscian framework).
The concept of "hegemony" in contemporary IR has several faces which are "as the production of *coercion*, the production of *consent*, the production of *attraction* and the production of *life*" (Antoniades, 2008, p.11). However, as Antoniades argues (2008, p.2), the common characteristic of all IR approaches to the concept is that: "the concept of hegemony may imply a great capacity for coercion and/or a great degree of influence or control of the structures of the international system and the international behaviour of its units, but it excludes situations where we have the establishment of relations of direct and official control of foreign governments or territories".

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"Critical theory is a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not with the past but with a continuing process of historical change" (Cox, 1981, p. 129). In critical theory, "historical structures", which are ideas, institutions and material capabilities, are constantly in a dynamic process of configuration (Cox, 1981, p. 136). The material capabilities (power) are the ability to transform technological and natural resources into productive or destructive forces. Ideas are the subjective collective images and norms of behavior of a group of people. Institutions become the means by which ideas are stabilized and which then take on an existence of their own. Historical structures can be applied at three levels; at production level (social forces), state level (forms of state) and world-order (world orders) level, all three of which are also interconnected (Cox, 1981, p. 138). Hegemony, therefore, is a dynamic interplay between the three historical structures and at the different levels. Institutions, for instance, gain hegemony when ideas and material power enable their consolidation without coercion (Leysens, 2008, p. 48). State hegemony, exists legitimately by deriving hegemony from the interaction between material capability, institutions and ideas (Cox, 1981, p. 139; Leysens, 2008, p. 48; Unay, 2010, p. 42). The state, society and the global order are, in a constant dialectic with each other (Mittelman, 1998, p. 70).

**Coxian Historicism**

Cox's theory on historical structures offers a means to investigate the dialectic between material capabilities, institutions and ideas and how their interaction can enable a change in a particular context (Cox, 1981, p. 137) (See figure 1). As Cox points out, the relationship of the three forces are reciprocal, and the "question of which way the lines of forces will run is always an historical question to be answered by a study of a particular case" (Cox, 1981, p. 136).



Relationship of the three structures

(Cox,1981, p. 136)

Berry points out that Cox's use of ideas as one of the important forces in this triumvirate that positions agency as an influencing aspect that impacts on material capabilities and institutions (Berry, 2007, p. 13). Cox (1981, p. 136) describes two types of ideas: intersubjective ideas (shared notions of how society is organized that produce continued habits and beliefs) and collective images of social order (these are held by different people that become the medium for discourses both shard and opposed). Cox also points out that the dialectic nature of the three forces, while a limited to, and simplified aspect of a greater totality,  differentiates the historical structures methods of analysis from the positivist, problem-solving framework's *ceteris paribus* (Cox, 1981, p. 137).

Cox (1981, p. 137) suggests the use of the historical structures method through the following process:

 1. By first defining each particular structure: this needs to be made, not from a set formulaic definition of a structure, but by exploring the historical situation within which it is set.

 2. This needs to be followed by looking at the emerging rival structures that may offer alternative structures and new developments.

 3. Each set of structures can be applied at three levels: social forces (production processes), forms of state (the complex interplay between the state and the society) and world orders (the configuration of forces that can resolve the problem of war or peace for a collection of states). These three levels, too, dialectically interact with each other, with a change in one impacting the other and creating a reconfiguration.

 Cox, brings the historical structures and the three levels together by defining their interrelationship and dialectic co-creativity:

> Considered separately, social forces, forms of state and world orders can be represented in a preliminary approximation as a particular configuration of material capabilities, ideas and institutions (as indicated in figure 1). Considered in relation to each other, and thus moving towards fuller representation of historical process, each will be seen as containing, as well as bearing the impact of, the others…
>
>                                           Cox (1981, p.137)

4. Barry (2007, p. 19), points out that Cox's historical structures methods enables the researcher to give both primacy and interactivity to ideational structures as they can cause material outcomes.

5. The stability of a particular level and persistence of a particular configuration of historical structures are linked by Cox to hegemony (defined by Cox as the production of consent). He equates structural stability to the concept of hegemony (Cox, 1981, p.139). And concludes that, "The notion of hegemony is a particular fit between power, ideas and institutions…"(Cox, 1981, p. 140).

6. In order to decide if the historical structure of one of the levels has collapsed and a structural transformation has taken place, Cox recommends that the analyst asks the following two questions (Cox, 1981, p. 144):

1. "…what are the mechanisms for maintaining hegemony in this particular historical structure?"

2. "…what social forces and forms of state have been generated within it, which could oppose and ultimately bring about a transformation of the structure?"

## Liberal Peace Critique, Hybridity and the 'Local-Everyday'.

Contemporary liberal peacebuilding critique draws from the IR critical theoretical framework, and has enlarged its critical framework to incorporate the analytical tools offered by a range of other disciplines: subaltern studies, postcolonial studies and development studies (Tom, 2012, p. 12; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 11). The current liberal peacebuilding critical discourse can be divided into a ""power based" critique' and ""ideas based" critique" (Chandler, 2011, p. 176). The power based critique argues that liberal peace is a means by which Western states consolidate their global hegemony, while the ideas based critique point out the problematic of the universal assumptions inherent in the liberal peace thesis and normative problems of policy and practice (Chandler, 2011, p.176, p. 178). Within the field of liberal peacebuilding, the "emancipatory" critique, which ranges from an outright dismissal of peacebuilding on the grounds of its Western, neo-colonial orientation, to a call for a transformed alternative, has engendered much debate and division (see Paris, 2011, p. 161). This debate can be framed within a question of whether there is an alternative to liberal peacebuilding. As

Paris (2011, p. 166) points out, solutions such as outright international governance or adaptation to a local model, have not been clear alternatives and therefore some form of liberal peace remains the foundation of  much of the critical debate. However, as Paris one of the leading academics of the ideas/policy based critique (Chandler, 2011, p.179), says: "The greatest strength of critical approaches has always been their focus on exposing and dissecting widely held assumptions and orthodoxies" (Paris, 2011, p. 168).

Critics such as Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty have questioned the very bases of liberal peacebuilding and argued for the need for frameworks for both evaluation and practice. Richmond argues for a post-liberal peace (2011a) and Mac Ginty a hybrid peace (2011). The critique, in effect, emphasizes the need to relook at the bases of power in peacebuilding and questions of the epistemology and the ontology of peace as it is used in IR (Richmond, 2008). As Richmond and Mac Ginty point out:

> The most significant contribution made by the critique of the liberal peace
> has been the construction of a framework of analysis allowing scholars to
> unpack the evolving nature of various forms of peace activity (Chandler,
> 2009; Mac Ginty, 2008; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2005; 2013a).
>                                    (Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2014, p. 4)

Without a critical engagement which takes a macro approach to liberal peace study, Paris argues, it is not possible to ascertain how peace work is interwoven with the larger political dynamics prevalent at the time (Paris, 2010, p. 29). In a defense of liberal peace against the criticisms levelled against it, Paris insists that the need at the moment is not to look for alternative to liberal peace, but to "reform existing approaches within a broadly liberal framework" (Paris, 2010, p. 362). He points that the debate on liberal peace needs to be constructively critical, engaging in studies that ask questions that explore issues such as "legitimacy", obligations of international actors and local ownership of peace (Paris, 2010, p. 363- 364).

The most wide-ranging and significant contribution to the contemporary critical debate, is by Richmond who looks at going beyond the epistemological basis of the liberal peace thesis to develop a post liberal peace that incorporates the local.  As he says, the current disarray of liberal peacebuilding, calls for an urgent need to explore the terms, "the local", "the everyday", "the hybrid", and "the infra politics of peacebuilding" (Richmond,

2011a, p. 13-16). The new, emerging, understanding of words such as agency, the use of language and practices push exiting enlightenment western social science driven assumptions to their boundaries to create a peace that resonates with the recipients (Richmond, 2011a, p. 21). This is the cutting edge of the liberal peacebuilding critique, which calls for a radical rehauling of IR's approach to research agendas, practice and policy, to build a new peace that creates a global order that can incorporate different ways of being locals. The need to be reflective of, and acknowledge the framework within which phenomena occurs, is one of the central aims of critical IR theory. In emancipatory peacebuilding critique, this has opened up areas of research, that explore the ontologies and epistemologies that are taken as a given in liberal peacebuilding practice. Richmond and Mac Ginty (2014, p. 11) point out that one of the main contributions of liberal peacebuilding critique has been the questioning of categories that inform liberal peacebuilding. Categories and concepts such as peace, agency, freedom, are assumed to have universal validity in peacebuilding practice. The use of language in peacebuilding, "good governance", and "capacity building" recreate power dynamics similar to that between the colonizers and the colonized in a modern framework of Western and non-Western (see Richmond & Mac Ginty 2014; Sabaratnam 2011b). Led primarily by academics such as Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, this strand of the liberal peace critique explores the different approaches to peace in a "hybrid peace" (Mac Ginty, 2011) or a "post liberal peace" (Richmond, 2011a). This critique unpacks the manner in which the local and the liberal peace project engage, contest each other and consolidate, and seeks to describe the possibilities this consolidation offers (Tom, 2011, p. 134).

Richmond (2011a, p. 19) defines the local "… to denote what international actors normally perceive as a range of actors and terrains spanning their non-Western and "non-liberal" partners for liberal peacebuilding and state building at the elite level …". The "local", for Richmond, is not a binary other to the liberal or the international in the form of "illiberal" or the "non-Western". He points out that the local may possess substantial degrees of trans-national and transversal experience in liberal politics (Richmond, 2011a. p. 14). Richmond gives the "local" greater nuance with the term "local-local", to indicate

the diversity of the communities and individuals that make up the local political space as opposed to the "liberally projected artifice of elite and civil society" (Richmond, 2011a, p. 14).  The everyday life of the "local" therefore is embedded with the possibilities of contestation, resistance and transformation of the liberal through the "critical agency" the local possess from a range of context specific factors such as identity and customs (Richmond, 2011a, p.16).  In this search for an alternative to normative liberal peace practice, the concept of "critical agency" becomes fundamental (Richmond, 2011a, p.17). Critical agency is, therefore, the marginalized's, the local's and the subaltern's re-politicization and reclaiming of their agency in response to the state-centric peacebuilding processes that have failed to take account of their needs (see Richmond, 2011a, pp. 117-150). Richmond situates the "local" within the space he calls the "everyday", both of which, have been traditionally "evacuated" from social science inquiry due to the difficulties it poses on an inquiry for its vagueness, banality, the risk of stereotyping and the opposition it creates to the state or the international (2011a, p. 14). The distancing of peacebuilding practitioners and academics from this ordinary banality of everyday lives of people is a return to colonial intellectual practice that maintains a distance from the subject to ensure a differentiation that confirms an illiberal other (Richmond, 2011b, p. 227). This distancing has engendered a "colonial anxiety" and a local resistance from which, a critical agency emerges, with its inherent possibilities of a post-liberal peace (Richmond, 2011a; 2011b). The post-liberal calls for the international as well the state and its liberal elite practitioner to be open to different forms of being, to focus on needs instead of rights, explore material desires that are described by the individual instead prescribed by the international and the developmental frameworks. Richmond (2011a; 2011b) points out that a post-liberal peace enables the liberal to be united with the local and allows a gradual political transformation from the bottom that will create an equitable global order.  Richmond's emancipatory critique provides a window into exploring a local context through the "local-everyday".

Mac Ginty's hybridity provides a window into exploring the hybrid nature of the local context and the hybridization of peace that occurs in interventionist liberal peace processes (Mac Ginty, 2011). The concept of hybridity and hybridization are not new.

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Their roots can be traced to the 19th century, but its emergence in contemporary academia can be traced to the postcolonial critiques, primarily Homi Bhabha (Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 70-71). Mac Ginty argues that hybridity is not the result of two completely different actions, practices, norms etc., coming together to create a new, third form, but is rather, a complex, variable, multifaceted outcome that is multiple, simultaneous, organic and long drawn (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 72). Neither is hybridity the amalgamation of "personnel, material techniques and justificatory ideas" that characterize multilateral organizations and peacebuilding mechanisms used by interventionist programmes (Mac Ginty, 2011, p.75). Hybridization can render binary conceptualizations meaningless and words ineffective, but Mac Ginty recognizes that some actors or processes are more hybrid than others in their ability to negotiate or resist the process of transferring or receiving the will of others (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 73). In liberal peacebuilding, where interventionist peacebuilding projects are introduced to post conflict contexts, hybrid peace is a long drawn out social process that occurs at multiple levels, with multiple media and actors to create a peace that is unlike that imagined through the liberal framework. Mac Ginty points out that a hybrid peace conflicts with the universalizing goals of liberal peace which has resulted in excluding minorities and the disadvantaged. Liberalism and its universalizing and top down reform mechanisms destroy the pluralism that occurs, naturally, on ground in the everyday in a society's own unique means of pluralism and tolerance. Resistance is an aspect of local engagement with and response to liberal peacebuilding mechanism that has large amount of resources and structural power and is not necessarily a binary engagement, and can result in a hybrid, outcome. For all this however, where the post-liberal (Richmond, 2011a) is created through hybridity, Mac Ginty cautions that the possibility of such a peace emerging in a post conflict society is dependent on the quality of the external researchers. He points out that researchers need to be able to step outside their strictures, language and methodologies and use antennae that is able to pick the salient qualities of a society. As Mac Ginty (2011, p. 209) points out: "One of the travesties of contemporary academia is that it has developed ways of discussing peace and conflict that exclude the very societies that are under review."

**Critical Methodology in Liberal Peacebuilding Research in Sri Lanka:**

Much of the existing research the conflict in Sri Lanka focuses on assessing liberal peacebuilding mechanisms, policy and intervention outcomes of the attempts at the resolution of the Sri Lankan conflict, from within ideas-problem solving frameworks (see Devotta, 2000, Edirippulige, 2000; Stokke & Uyangoda, 2011)[5]. A critical theory and methodology allows a researcher to formulate the problem and investigate it as a critique of the existing hegemonic-epistemological framework and ontological assumptions used in peacebuilding scholarship in Sri Lanka.  The reseach on liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding in Sri Lanka up to the 1980's is engaged through the lenses of political science and historiography. However, liberal peace principles have been in the Sri Lankan political discourse from the 19th century, with the debates on separation of powers, state reform and electoral representation taking center stage (see Bandarage, 2009, p. 22; Edrisinha, Gomez, et. al., 2008; Mendis, 1956).  However the use of "liberal peace" language  from the ideological and policy framework of the modern liberal world order for promoting "individual and political freedom, representative democracy, tolerance and those economic arrangements which are most conducive to a free society" (Amaratunga, 1989, p. 3), enters the political discourse only in the 1980s. This can be traced to the inauguration of the Council for Liberal Democracy by a small group of men, some of whom were educated at Oxford University in the United Kingdom. The entry of a distinct liberal discourse into the political scene and the formation of a political party, the Liberal Party, created a liberal theoretical framework that appears at first glance to have brought a fresh framework of analysis for exploring a modality for creating an equitable, secular Sri Lankan society. The liberal discourse that appeared in the 1980s was indeed the first explicit acknowledgement of its framework of analysis, which initially explored state and constitutional reform mechanisms for liberal peacebuilding. That the contemporary local political discourse is embedded in an epistemological framework of liberal peace is, ironically, best depicted in the *Interim Report of the Sinhala Commission Report of 1997,* which seeks to maintain the political hegemony of the Sinhala-Buddhists. The report develops its arguments for maintaining Sinhala

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[5] See Chapter Two of this thesis for a detailed exploration of the existing body of work on peacebuilding in Sri Lanka.

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Buddhist hegemony based on the liberal peace framework of power separation and democratic principles, especially parliamentary sovereignty, while expressing concerns about the Sinhala Buddhists constituency being divided and weakened (see Edrisinha, Gomez, et. al., 2008: 587, p. 619).

The labeling of the contemporary discourse, as liberal, however, succeeds in veiling the epistemological foundation of much of the previous political, historiography and policy literature on attempts at creating equity for citizens in Sri Lanka. Most, political science, international relations, historiography, and administrative and foreign policy (see Jayawardane, 2004) literature on Sri Lankan have an epistemology of liberal peace and peacebuilding, although the works do not explicitly recognize this foundation. This is particularly relevant as even much of the state reform literature to emerge from a Marxist and "left" basis are grounded in a liberal framework, which is reflected in the policy documents of the early 20th century as well as in the discourse of the 21st century[6]. Their contribution to the discourse on equity for all individuals in Sri Lanka (especially over the issue of the disenfranchisement of the Plantation Tamil workers and the equal use of vernacular languages) is significant (see Edirippulige, 2000, p.157). However, it must be noted that where the "left" politicians turned to federalism as a solution to the ethnic differences, they do so through an ideological logic derived from a Marxist analysis. This analysis, unlike the exploration of liberal mechanisms of their contemporaries, enabled the leaders to map possible social and political transformations that may occur in the future (Edrisinha, Gomez, et. al., 2008, p. 117; Keuneman & Vaidialingam in Edirisinha, Gomez, et, al., 2008, p. 116). However the power of nationalist politics to override ideological values of the left leaders was highlighted when they capitulated to the majority discourse and joined SWRD Bandaranaike in 1956 to form the Mahajana Eksath Permuka (MEP) in order to stay in power (Edirippulige, 2000, p.157). This capitulation reflects the gap between the liberal discourse and the political ground reality of Sri Lanka. At one end of this spectrum are the national leaders who invariably capitulate their liberal democratic values to the demands of ethno-religious politics when their

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[6]  See Edrisinha, Gomez, et. al., 2008, pp. 105-120 for the early work by the political leaders  espousing a communist ideology who look to federalism as a  means for power sharing and http://ravaya.lk/, a broadsheet that has communist roots, but espouses liberal values.

position in power is threatened by an electoral defeat. On the other end are the scholars and policy makers who recognize the damaging impact and the hindrance of local politics on the creation of a liberal peace, who nevertheless approach the issue through a liberal peace problem solving discourse. This highlights the need to reevaluate the epistemological and boundaries of the conflict in Sri Lanka and to explore the source of hegemony in the state[7].

The overriding epistemological foundation of a liberal peace ideology in the Sri Lankan discourse has a combination of reasons.  The formation of the modern Sri Lankan State has a basis in liberal governance through the separation of powers going back to the mid nineteenth century. The epistemological foundation of the Sri Lankan State, starting from its colonial heritage and the educational background of prominent intellectual-policy makers of the country[8], to the influencing of sociological research in Sri Lanka, is reflected by the work to emerge from some of the main research institutions of the country (see de Silva J., 2005, p. 536). Acknowledging the epistemological foundation of the existing body of knowledge and state formation is essential to the critical research framework of this thesis.

The war and the conflict in Sri Lanka have attracted a significant group of Sri Lankan, as well as regional and Northern, scholars who have used the Sri Lankan experience to contribute theoretically as well as empirically to the global literature on liberal peacebuilding. This body of literature has paralled the post-cold war genealogy of liberal peacebuilding debates. This has resulted, initially, in a prevalence of work from problem-solving, positivist frameworks of analysis, which have, in the last few decades transitioned to critical constructionist frameworks, mirroring the global liberal peacebuilding critical discourse.  This liberal peacebuilding discourse, in turn, has had a

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[7] This comment is based on a Coxian critical framework (Cox, 1981).
[8] SWRD Bandaranaike and Chanaka Amaratunga (both proponents of federalism) were educated at Christ Church and University College, of Oxford University, respectively. Colvin R. de Silva (one of the founder members of the Marxist, *Lanka Sama Samaja Party)*, read for his doctoral dissertation on the British in Ceylon at Kings College, University of London, S. A. Wickremasinghe (the founder of the Communist Party), did his postgraduate studies in medicine at the University of London, and Phillip Gunawardena (a founder member of the *Lanka Sama Samaja Party*) read economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

significant influence on policy and practice in the attempts at resolving the conflict and ending the war in Sri Lanka.

The early research, from the start of the armed conflict in the 1980s, included contributions by scholars and commentators primarily in Sri Lanka from IR as well as other disciplines, such as history, political science and anthropology: M. G. A, Cooray; Shelton Kodikara, K. M. de Silva, A. Ariyaratne, Amal Jayawardane, Gamini Keerawella, Mahinda Werake, P. V. J. Jayasekera, Jane Russell, Michael Roberts, Ketheeswaran Loganathan and Jayadeva Uyangoda. Also significant are the few scholars from the North: Patrick Peebles, Richard Gombrich and Bruce Kapferer. With the end of the cold war and the dominance of a liberal peace global agenda, and the persistence of the Sri Lankan conflict, a wider group of Northern scholars and regional scholars too entered the space of knowledge creation on the conflict, war and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. The period from the late 1980s, through the 2000s saw the entry of Northern theorists and peace PR actioners such as Johan Galtung, John Paul Lederach and Kristian Stokke who introduced and worked from within Northern epistemological frameworks that would dominate the peace processes of Sri Lanka. This period included an influx of scholars and analysts in law and human rights (Rohan Edrisinha, Neelan Tiruchlevam, Deepika Udagama), in history and IR (Sisira Edirippulige, Dayan Jayatilleke, Nayani Melegoda, Chanaka Thalpahewa, Maneesha Wanasinghe-Pasqual, Nira Wickremasinghe,) local political analysts (Chanaka Amaratunga, Rohan Gunaratna, Sinha Ratnatunga).

The gaze of the regional scholars and Northern scholars is also significant as the local reserch on the conflict provided empirical data to the global and regional debates: Neil Devotta, J. N. Dixit, Jonathan Goodhand, S. D. Muni, Urmila Padhnis, H. Shinoda, Jonathan Spencer and Chanaka Thalpahewa. The gradual transition of mainstream liberal peace discourse into a critical constructionist discourse has also had a significant impact on the most recent phase in the genealogy of the Sri Lankan discourse. The scholarship has engaged with issues of peacebuilding through embedded research on the dividends of peace, hybridity and the encounter between the global mechanisms of liberal

peacebuilding and specific encounters with the local by scholars such as: Benedikt Korf, Nayani Melegoda, Camilla Orjuela and Maneesha Wanasinghe-Pasqual.

Much of the literature on liberal peace and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka in the past have engaged with peacebuilding through a problem-solving (Cox, 1981) framework instead of a critical (Cox, 1981) framework. There is a body of research emerging from within a critical/constructivist perspective, examining the impact of liberal peacebuilding on liberal peace and peace in Sri Lanka (Goodhand & Korf, 2011; Orjuela, 2008).  The work of Uyangoda is of relevance here as he has made significant contributions to the critique and pointed out the need for future research based on his studies. He comments "…absence of a class or political force in the majority Sinhalese community to carry out the 'historical task' of resolving the 'national question' with a firm resolve and commitment", and he raises the question as to whether an "external actor [could] play the agential role?" (Uyangoda, 2011, p. 45). Jayatilleka (2013, p. 452) echoes Uyangoda in his comments on the lack of political agency in the Sinhala-Buddhists for searching for a solution to the national question. The existing research, therefore raises the question of agency, peace ownership and intervention, but does not engage with the ontological or epistemological foundations of the issues.

The assumption throughout the peacebuilding processes in postcolonial Sri Lanka has been, in the early phase, that the conflict (then an elites' conflict), could be resolved top-down through reform mechanisms. In its mature phase, where the conflict has been politicized within the electoral discourse, it has been approached from the post-cold war peacebuilding framework of a multi-pronged approach including bottom-up peace creation and ownership mechanisms and top-down reform. Both approaches fail to question the epistemological framework and the ontologies of concepts such as agency and peace in relation to the "everyday-local"[9] as engaged in the global critical scholarship.

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[9] See the Chapter Three for a discussion of Richmond's (2008) concept of the "local" and "everyday".

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Once situated within a critical framework, it is necessary to assess the two segments of the local conflict. The first pertains to the immediate events of the conflict and its continual reconstruction. A critical methodology, however, will  allow researchers to explore the liberal peace assumptions on which the peacebuilding attempts of the Sri Lanka conflict have been  founded, and trace, instead, the underlying hegemonic bases that guided those assumptions.

The global critique highlights the lacunas as well as possible agendas for research on liberal peacebuilding in a case such as Sri Lanka. The most relevant in this lacuna is the need for case-specific research, based within the critical theoretical framework, which brings in the "local" and the "everyday" to the forefront. Richmond and Mac Ginty (2014, p. 14) identify the need to look at the "most marginal", in other words, the "conflict's subjects" and the need for research into the "nature of hybrid political orders".

In terms of methodology, Richmond and Mac Ginty emphasize that it is "…prudent to get beyond the obsession with levels of analyses, which are of limited worth if we do not seriously examine the epistemologies upon which they are based. Each of the levels is a construction behind which lies a story of our place in the world" (2014, p. 14). Of particular relevance to research on the Sri Lankan confict is Hameri's point that:

> …effects of intervention cannot be understood nor evaluated in terms of
> disembodied ideas of peace or statehood, but only through a historically
> informed analysis of the development of the actual social and political
> forces present, as well as the institutions and spaces through which power is
> contested.
>
>                                          (Hameri, 2011, p. 206)

**Conclusion:**

 The critical turn in IR, which began in the 1980s, was spearheaded by Robert W. Cox, whose work pioneered critical international theory. Cox drew from the work of Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School, and differentiated  critical theory of the international sphere from  traditional (problem solving – in Coxian terms) theory, which is bound by positivist methodology and a preference towards legitimizing the prevailing social-political order (Devetak, 2005, p. 141). The value of Coxian analysis, has remined and continues to be  acknowledged in  contemporary research, and the power-based

critique of liberal peacebuilding acknowledges its debt to Cox. The analytical tools provided by Cox provides a methodological framework for research into the Sri Lankan conflict, which has continued, until very recently to be examined through the framework of liberal peacebuilding. An examination of the epistemological boundaries of the existing research on the conflict in Sri Lanka, displays a body of work that is primarily made of research, that Cox identified as problem solving research and not research that is reflective of the epistemological and ontological assumptions on which it is based. A methodology that seeks to stabilize the world order it is part of. This paper concludes that a shift from problem solving research to critical research, using methodological tools such as that provided by Coxian historicism, will enable the research on the Sri Lankan conflict to expand its epistemological and ontological boundaries. This expansion will enable researchers to identify assumptions and validations that continue to recreate problems and solutions pertaining to the Sri Lankan conflict that remain within the ideological framework of the liberal world order, but have failed to break or end the cycle of contestation, resistance and conflict.

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# Regulatory efficiency and Free Trade in SAARC: Implications on impacts of OBOR on SAARC Trade

Kasuni Ranasinghe[1,] Priyanga Dunusinghe[2] ,Athula Ranasinghe[3]

[1]Assistant Lecturer, Faculty of Graduate Studies, University of Colombo.
[2]Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Colombo.
[3]Professor in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Colombo.

## Abstract

Transportation is a strong factor in terms of economic development. As well as also having a great influence on regional integration. South Asia has a rich history of trade through sea. Thus ports constitute important economic activities in the region. This paper mainly exposes the role of the efficiency of harbors in trade performances. An extended version of gravity model is used to analyze the correlation of transport infrastructure and exports of South Asia. For the purpose of analysis in this paper, all eight South Asian countries are identified as exporters and selected 25 countries as the partnering countries. Estimated results show that the distance between two countries has negative impact on trade. Country size measured in terms of GDP has positive effect on trade. It is also observed that the compliance time in both reporting country as well as the partner country has a significant influence on trade. Higher compliance time discourages trade. Based on this finding, this study explores the impacts of OBOR on SAARC trade. It is anticipated that the OBOR expands trade through its impact on reducing compliance time.

**Key Words:** Harbor efficiency, SAARC Economic Integration, OBOR, Gravity Model

## 1. Introduction

This paper explores one of the non-conventional determinants of international trade. Namely the relationship between exports and efficiency in trade measured in terms of compliance time to trade regulations. This study assumes that the compliance time is determined by three factors; *trade regulations, level of good governance* and *technological innovations*. More stringent regulations and corrupted be bureaucratic practices increase compliance time and more efficient technological innovations reduce the compliance time. Higher compliance time is identified as a deterrent for free trade. Therefore, it is postulated that the compliance time and volume of trade are negatively correlated. An extended gravity model is estimated using compliance time of export country and partner country as determinants of export from SAARC regional countries.

For modeling purposes, only SAARC countries are selected as exporters with 25 partner countries including also SAARC countries.

Findings of this study are interpreted in the context of emerging One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. More specifically, it is assumed that the OBOR investments on transport will increase efficiency of world trade by reducing time and cost of transport of goods from one country to another country for the purpose of the analysis in this study. As a result of reduced time and cost trade is encouraged. In order to capture the effect of increased transportation efficient, gravity model is estimated with transportation efficiency as an explanatory variable in the gravity model.

## 2.  The Model

Tinbergen invented the gravity model to determine the relationship between bilateral trade and GDP, distance, border and other factors that affect the trade flow. Initially, this concept is based on the Newton's law of gravity. Thus the stranded model estimated that trade between countries is proportional to the gross domestic product of both countries while inversely relate to the distance. However, the theoretical equation of the model is developed over time. Following the method adopted according to the original work of Tinbergen (1962) and Anderson (1979), initial model of gravity model is specified as follows[1].

$$\ln E_{ij} = \alpha + \beta \ln D_{ij} + \lambda_1 \ln Y_i + \lambda_2 \ln Y_j + \lambda_3 \ln P_i + \lambda_4 P_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \qquad (1)$$

Where, $E_{ij}$ stands for Exports from country $i$ to $j$, $D_{ij}$ represents Distance from country $i$ to country $j$. $Y_i$ and $Y_j$ in the model represent GDP of export country and GDP of import country respectively and $P_i$ and $P_j$ represent population of two countries. According to Newton's principle gravity is mainly depends on 2 factors; *Distance* between the two objects and their *size*. Closer the distance and larger in size the two objects are strongly attached to each other. Following this theory, Tinbergen (1962) used it to describe bi-lateral trade pattern of the world where, distance is measured in terms of distance between two countries and size is measured in terms of size of the economy. In the literature, size of the economy is measured in terms of several variables such as GDP,

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[1] At the estimation stage Population variables were dropped due to heavy multicolinearity problem.

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Population and Land area. According to Newton theory and Tinbergen interpretation in trade context, Distance should have negative impact on trade and all the size variables should have positive impact. Therefore, in the above equation, β is negative and all Ʌs are positive.

Following the conceptual framework, in order to capture the effect of compliance cost on trade two variables are identified; *Tine to handle container* and *Cost to handle a container*. Adding the two variables to the initial gravity model following equation is defined.

$$\ln E_{ij} = \alpha + \beta \ln D_{ij} + \lambda_1 \ln Y_i + \lambda_2 \ln Y_j + \lambda_3 \ln P_i + \lambda_4 P_j + \delta_1 \ln T_i + \delta_2 \ln T_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \qquad (2)$$

According to this equation, whether compliance cost affects trade negatively is measured by the size and sign of two δ coefficients of the equation (2). It is anticipated that the two δ coefficients are negative and statistically significant.

Equation (2) within the given theoretical context is sufficient to have a general understanding about the effect of regulations on trade. We are also interested in identifying the effects of trade compliances on trade between SAARC countries. In this model it is captured in terms of a dummy interactive term of $\ln T_i$ and $\ln T_j$ variables with dummy representing SAARC countries.

For the purpose of the analysis in this research only SAAR member countries are selected as Export countries. Import countries comprises with all SAARC countries and other countries with significant trade (import from SAARC) with SAARC.

3. **Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix**

This section of the paper report key descriptive statistics of the variables used for the purpose of the analysis. Table 1 presents the regional composition of volume of imports from SAARC countries.

Table 1: Trade Performance of SAARC

| | 2009 | 2013 | 2015 | 2016 | Overall Growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SAARC | 264 | 548 | 557 | 677 | 0.13 |
| ASEAN | 781 | 1,507 | 1,004 | 1,297 | 0.07 |
| USA | 4,622 | 8,849 | 8,830 | 12,055 | 0.14 |
| EU | 1,367 | 2,411 | 2,362 | 2,504 | 0.09 |
| OPEC | 1,509 | 2,552 | 2,084 | 2,879 | 0.09 |
| Unclassified | 287 | 762 | 492 | 801 | 0.15 |
| Overall | 909 | 1,687 | 1,441 | 1,822 | 0.10 |

Source: Author, Based on World Integrated Trade Solution

First row of Table 1 represents average export within SAARC region. Other rows represent the SAARC exports to countries belong other regional cooperation or regional blocks. However, it should be noted that the data representing other regional blocs do not represent the entire block due to the selection process for this study. For this exercise only the countries with significant volume of exports from SAARC countries are selected. For example, from the European Union only two countries are in this sample (The UK and Germany)[2]. Statistics shown in Table 1 indicate that the USA, the EU and the OPEC have become the most significant export destinations for the SAARC on average.

Table 2 presents the correlation among the variables used in this exercise.

Where, E is the value of Export, D is the Distance between reporting country (exporter) and partner country (importer)[3]. X variables measure attributes of partner countries and Z variables measure the same attributes of reporting countries. Subscripts 1, 2 and 3 are respectively representing GDP, Population and Time to import (export). This is the estimated time required to comply with all procedures required to import (export) goods. Time is measured in terms of days.

First column of the table shows correlation coefficient between the dependent variable and independent variables.

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[2] For this study only countries to which SAARC exports in significant volumes are included.

[3] Distance is measured in KMs.

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These correlation coefficients represent partial relation between the dependent variable and independent variables.

Table 2: Correlation Matrix

| | lnE | lnD | $X_1$ | $X_1$ | $X_3$ | $Z_1$ | $Z_2$ | $Z_3$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| lnE | 1.00 | | | | | | | |
| lnD | 0.04 | 1.00 | | | | | | |
| $X_1$ | 0.29 | 0.62 | 1.00 | | | | | |
| $X_2$ | 0.21 | 0.18 | 0.73 | 1.00 | | | | |
| $X_3$ | -0.18 | -0.46 | -0.47 | 0.09 | 1.00 | | | |
| $Z_1$ | 0.70 | -0.04 | -0.13 | -0.12 | 0.10 | 1.00 | | |
| $Z_2$ | 0.63 | -0.08 | -0.15 | -0.11 | 0.13 | 0.96 | 1.00 | |
| $Z_3$ | -0.50 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.03 | -0.55 | -0.31 | 1.00 |

Source: Calculated using World Bank Data

All other cells represent the linear relationship between explanatory variables. Higher correlation between explanatory variables is identified as the multicolinearity problem. Correlation matrix above shows that there are high correlation between Distance (lnD) and GDP of importing country($X_1$) , GDP and Population of importing country ($X_2$) and GDP of exporting country ($Z_1$) and Population of exporting country ($Z_2$). Whether the level of multicolinearity is at harmful level can be determined on the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor)[4].

## 4. Model Estimation

Table 3 presents the regression results of Gravity model. The model is estimated at three levels. First the Base Gravity model is presented. This includes only the key variables prescribed in literature.

Second model has included the log value of cost of container handling in SAARC countries. The third model introduces interactive terms of log Cost with two regional cooperation dummies (SAARC and ASEAN).

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[4] $VIF_k = \dfrac{1}{1 - R_k^2}$ . Where, $VIF_k$ is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of $k^{th}$ explanatory variable and $R_k$ is the multiple correlation of $k^{th}$ explanatory variable with other explanatory variables. The rule of thumb is that the VIF greater than 4 is alarming.

In terms of adjusted $R^2$ and F stats all the models are good in terms of their explanatory power. All the models explain over 50 percent of total variation of the dependent variable. The Root MSE is around 2 for all the models. The Root MSE is a measure of efficiency and unbiasedness of the models. It is stable around some value across all the models indicate that with the changes of model unbiasedness and efficiency are unaffected.

All the t-values are greater than 2 indicating that all the egression coefficients are statistically significant and all VIF values are less than 4. This indicates that the multicolinearity problem is not at serious level[5].

All the key variables in Base Gravity model are with expected signs. Distance between two countries discourages export. This indicates that on average more trade takes place between close by countries. Log GDP of reporting country (exporter) and partner country (importer) show positive correlation. These variables measure the distance and size effects on gravity. This is consistent with Newton's principle and all the empirical estimates of gravity model.

In addition to the base variables of gravity model, two more variables are added to Model 2. Namely, Time to comply with export procedures in exporting country and Time to comply with import procedures in importing countries are added.

According to the conceptual framework, it is expected that OBOR increases the efficiency of trade facilitation. The efficiency of trade facilitation is measured in terms of time to comply export and import procedures. Log of exports is negatively related with both variables indicating that export is discouraged with longer time to comply with procedures. It is observed that the compliance time of exports has greater effect on trade (-1.81) than the effect of import procedures (-0.81). All the coefficients of the models estimated can be interpreted as point elasticity coefficients.

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[5] Variables with high VIF values are excluded from the model.

Table 4.3: Gravity Model

| | Base Gravity | | | Model 2 | | | Model 3 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coef. | T | VIF | Coef. | t | VIF | Coef. | t | VIF |
| log Distance | -1.35 | -4.53 | 1.63 | -1.79 | -6.12 | 1.80 | -1.22 | -4.06 | 2.17 |
| log GDP (Partner Country) | 0.99 | 9.27 | 1.65 | 0.93 | 8.99 | 1.78 | 1.03 | 10.10 | 1.98 |
| log GDP (Reporting Country) | 1.46 | 16.06 | 1.02 | 1.28 | 12.55 | 1.48 | 1.28 | 13.26 | 1.50 |
| log of Time to comply with import regulations | | | | -0.81 | -3.24 | 1.38 | -0.93 | -3.65 | 1.63 |
| Log of Time to comply with export regulations | | | | -1.81 | -3.55 | 1.50 | -2.58 | -4.62 | 2.05 |
| Interactive terms of Time to import and SAARC | | | | | | | -0.37 | -0.79 | 20.34 |
| Interactive term of Time to export and SAARC | | | | | | | 1.05 | 2.27 | 19.50 |
| Constant | -41.45 | -12.18 | | -23.68 | -4.80 | | -28.68 | -5.74 | |
| Adjusted R squared | 0.68 | | | 0.73 | | | 0.76 | | |
| F | 103.71 | | | 76.55 | | | 65.65 | | |
| Root MSE | 2.22 | | | 2.06 | | | 1.93 | | |
| N | 143 | | | 143 | | | 143 | | |

Source: Author

Following the conceptual framework, this suggests that the compliance time will decrease with OBOR through its investments in technological know-how and through efficient practices in harbor handling.

Interactive terms of SAARC with two compliance time variables are added to the model. This is to explore the difference of the OBOR impact on within SAARC trade and trade of SAARC with rest of the world. It is found that only the SAARC interactive term with export compliance time is statistically significant. Its positive sign (1.05) indicates that the effect of compliance time to export procedures is less for within SAARC trade than that for the trade with outside SAARC.

## 5.   Interpretation of Results

Results of the gravity model estimated in Section 4 are fully consistent with the theoretical expectations of the principle of gravity by Newton. According to Newton gravity is greater when the objects are closer and larger in size. The adoption of Newton's gravity principle to international trade suggests that the countries located closer engage in trade than the distance countries and larger countries will have more trade. The Base Gravity model reported in Table 3 above is consistent with this theoretical expectation. Subsequent models are constructed such that the previous model is nested in the subsequent model. For example, Base Gravity model is nested in Model 2 and Model 2 is nested in Model 3. Adjusted $R^2$ and F statistics reported in Table 3 under each model show that the addition of variables has improved the explanatory power of subsequent models significantly. These indicate that the proxy measures of OBOR effects on trade facilities and their interactive terms with a dummy representing SAARC countries have significant influence on the explanatory power of the gravity equation.

Using Model 2, Table 4: summarizes the compliance time elasticity measures

Table 4: Elasticity measures of SAARC exports

|  | Within SAARC | Outside SAARC |
|---|---|---|
| Distance elasticity | -1.22 | -1.22 |
| Size elasticity: Reporting Country | 1.28 | 1.28 |
| Size elasticity: Partner Country | 1.03 | 1.03 |
| Compliance time to export | -1.53 | -2.58 |
| Compliance time to import | -0.93 | -0.93 |
| Total compliance time | -2.46 | -3.51 |

Source: Own calculations using Regression results in Table 4.3

According to the elasticity coefficients reported in Table 4, each one percent increase (decrease) of distance between reporting (export) country and partner (import) country the trade is decreased (increased) by 1.22 percent[6].

Table 4 reports 2 size elasticity coefficients; reporting country and partner country. It is noted that the size elasticity of reporting (exporting) country is significantly greater than that of partner (importing) country; larger countries have greater potential of export as compared to the export potential of smaller countries.

When, compliance time for export procedures reduces (increases) by one percent, the trade within SAAR is decreased (increased) SAARC by 1.53 percent. The same will have 2.58 percent impact on SAARC trade with rest of the world. Total compliance time elasticity in the third row is estimated by adding the numbers in first two rows.

Each one percent increase (decrease) of compliance time for import procedures will decrease (increase) SAARC trade by 0.93 percent. This is equal for both within and outside trade with SAARC.

Assuming that the OBOR will reduce compliance time for trade, it is anticipated that the OBOR initiative will have positive impact on trade in the SAARC region. It is clearly noted that OBOR initiative will have larger impact on SAARC with outside SAARC countries than within SAARC trade. According to the last row of Table 4, each one

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[6] When the distance elasticity coefficient was decomposed into two as within SAARC trade and outside SAARC trade it was found that the distance elasticity for within SAARC is greater than that for outside SAARC trade.

percent decrease of compliance time due to OBOR will increase within SAARC trade by 2.46 percent and SAARC trade with rest of the world by 3.51 percent.

## 6. Summary and Conclusions

Using the aggregate data available from World Bank Open data bases and World Integrated Trade Solution, this study estimated the gravity model to describe the export pattern of SAARC countries. Therefore the reporting countries are only SAARC countries. However, partner countries include all SAARC countries and other major partner countries.

Estimated results show that the distance between two countries has negative impact on trade. Country size measured in terms of GDP has positive effect on trade. It is also observed that the compliance time in both reporting country as well as the partner country has a significant influence on trade. Higher compliance time discourages trade.

Using interactive terms of SAARC dummy and compliance time variables it is clearly observed that the compliance time effect becomes higher when SAARC countries engage in export with rest of the world.

A key assumption of this exercise is that OBOR will reduce the compliance time. Therefore, it is concluded that the OBOR will increase exports from SAARC countries. Therefore, the main hypothesis of this exercise that OBOR enhances trade is accepted by this study.

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# A Survey Of Community Perception On Policy Acceptance Of Environmental Taxation In Nigeria

Iliya Garba[1] , Kennedy Gunawardana[2]

MPhil/Ph.D. Student Faculty of Graduate Studies University of Colombo, Sri Lanka

Faculty of Management and Commerce, University of Sri- Jayewardenepura, Sri Lanka

## Abstract

The paper examines what will motivate the public to accept a policy that will acknowledge environmental taxation in Nigeria. Most of the reviewed literature revealed that the public support for policy instrument is dependent on their trust and their confidence in others, hence, we argued whether political trust and interpersonal trust affect individual support for acceptance or rejection of environmental taxation. Survey technique was used and a close-ended questionnaire was administered to an individual to elicit their responses. The researcher applied Yaro Yamane sample size calculation formulae based on the number of Samples under discussion. The finding of the study reveals that political confidence, interpersonal trust, ethical beliefs and norms of people are the major key player in determining policy acceptance of environmental taxes.

**Key words:** Environment, Nigeria, Policy, Taxation

## Introduction

Economists have long favored the use of taxes as an instrument for environmental corrections and protection. Economist analysis argue that, in a situation involving serious externalities taxes are the most effective mechanism for "getting the price right" (Lawrence 1994, Linda 2014).Environmental taxation have been discussed as one of the main mechanism to deal with environmental problems, a nonetheless instrument for this type have rarely been implemented because of policy acceptance is weak and the perception that environmental taxes are unfair and regressive, coercive and punitive. For this reasons, the adoption of new or higher environmental taxes has face resistance in some countries for example South Africa, New Zealand, Sweden (Sebestian 2013). A Large body of scholars such as ( Olson M 2013), asserted that many environmental collective action problems can best be resolved through the use of market-based policy

instrument such as environmental taxation. Because they are cost efficient and because they tend to leave a certain amount of freedom of choice (Cox head and Chain 2011), stated that environmental tax is a policy issue that has generated a particular interest in recent years, which involves increasing taxes on the use of environment and reduction of taxes in other areas. There will be more willingness on the part of individuals and cooperate organizations to pay the tax because they will believe that their benefits derived from them since the tax being paid has something to do with their environment ( Fulletone 1996). An environmental tax is defined as: "any compulsory, unreciprocated disbursement to the government, levied on tax-bases deemed to be of particular environmental relevance", where the tax bases include energy products, motor vehicles, wastes, measured or estimated emissions, natural resources, etc. (OECD, 2013). The OECD also consider environmental taxation as an instrument for a sustainable economy, that make use of tax system to encourage a change of attitude for economic agents to reduce the negative impact that their industrial practices cause to the environment. Furthermore, according to (Jeze 2013), taxes are defined as a pecuniary payment, require from individuals through authority and without a counter party. According to Lawrence (2015), defined an Environmental tax as A tax whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) of something that has a proven, particular negative impact on the environment." - the definition is exclusively based on the real physical unit of the tax.- focus emphasis on the potential effect of a given tax in terms of its impact on costs and prices

Historically, environmental protection has primarily been based on state based environmental protection, such as legislation and ban. However, nowadays environmental degradation is increasingly perceived as being based on individual citizen or consumer choices, others argue that coercive and firm policies will solve the problem (wheel and Mol 2009), some advocate for measures primarily aimed at "giving" citizens towards his environmental behaviours e.g through enlighten or education(Dobson 2003).

However, it is one thing to claim and demonstrate the market-based instruments are (economically) efficient and it is quite another thing to gain public support for them. This

has motivated scholars to into why some people tend to accept such environmental policy instrument, while other does not.

The aim of the paper is to explore Community perception of policy acceptance of environmental taxation. The study analyzes environmental tax and how it can be used to influence policy acceptance in the Nigerian context. Considering the numerous environmental problems

**Rationale for Environmental Taxes**

The main fundamental reasons for environmental taxation are to work with price system not against the price system and to allow the polluter's maximum flexibility to choose the most efficient way to achieve abatement goal in order to improve the structure of the taxes, for example by reducing tax concession for polluting activities. There exist a market failure in which market forces alone cannot provide enough environmental goods and service. Other environmental regulations are less effective in addressing the market failure than taxes and charges. Therefore, "polluter pays" principles as a rationale for environmental taxation as suggested by A.C Pigov (1920), that one person's actions may cause either benefits or costs to other members of the society. The existence of such social costs or benefits could be good reasons for government interference through the imposition of environmental taxes. Therefore good environmental policy is also good tax policy. In practice, environmental taxes seem to be the most attractive choice for most emerging markets. Because Collection is easier as it can rely on existing capacities and institutions

**Statement of the Problem**

While other developing countries have taken the initiative in environmental sustainability through taxations, Nigeria is lagged behind. Taxation can be a crucial market base instrument that can be used as synergy effort to move in this direction. As other countries have initiated a specific environmental taxes example South Africa, Malaysia, Vietnam just to mention a few. Nigerian governments have not made any effort despite an increase in environmental degradation, pollution from industries. Considering an increase in the

government expenditure on health well-being of its people due environmental pollution by industries

The absence of any estimation of damage costs and lack of implementing best practices of environmental taxes as done in other countries is felt the need. It is desired that this will fill a void in an environmental degradation and environmental policy in Nigeria.

**Scope of the study**

The research could not cover everybody under discussion in the study; it is therefore, limited to Six thousand individuals in Nigeria. One thousand from each six geopolitical zones whose have shown their interest to participate in the survey.

**Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of the study is to examine what motivate peoples to accept policy towards environmental issues in Nigeria.

The specific objectives are:

1. To ascertain the extent to which the policy makers influence the acceptance or support of environmental tax

2. To ascertain the extent of individual's perception that that environmental taxes are unfair and regressive.

**Literature Review and Conceptual Frame work**

The main economic reasons for using taxes in an environmental policy is to bring the costs of pollution and other costs of using the environment which is called the externalities into the price of the goods and services produced by the economic activity. Internalizing external environmental costs is the main reasons for environmental taxes

instead of regulations. The incorporate the cost of environmental service and damages directly into the prices of the goods, services or activities which give rise to them. These also help to implement the polluter's pays principles and to integrate economic, fiscal and environmental policies (EEA 2012).

A common argument for employing environmental taxes is that they are often comparatively economically efficient (Staner, Tietenberg 2013), clearly and important loadstar for politician and policy makers, however, it is questionable whether this criterion alone is good enough for adopting them. When designing policy tools, a decision maker constantly faces the challenges of carefully striking a balance between efficiency and legitimacy, as the level of direction, public policy support can be expected to have a measured impact on subsequent policy performance (Mattins2009). Furthermore, unless the measures display sufficient potentially broad public support, the suggested public instrument will likely not going to be advocated in the political sphere, and this will be rejected( Shapiro and Glynn 1999). For this reasons it is, therefore, necessary for society and its policy makers to understand the condition under which environmental taxes are considered legitimate among the public rather than be scared because of the word "tax". The intuition is that it is welfare improving to tax "bad" things high i.e. pollution and "good" things less. Because taxing bad thing is corrective and good things are distortionary.

Factors affecting individual's acceptance of environmental policy in general and acceptance of environmental taxes in particular. The researcher elaborates three major reasons or determinants for policy acceptance of environmental taxes in Nigeria. Thus are as follows:

i. political trust s a determinant of policy acceptance

ii. Values, Beliefs, and Norms as a determinant of policy acceptance

iii. Interpersonal trust as a determinant of policy acceptance

however, these are not the only factors that determine the policy acceptance, it is also apparently better to rely on peoples interest in the contents of their wallets than hoping

for people to change their preference based on moral reasoning. Cost efficient is also one of the important determinants for the prospects of implementing environmental taxes (Elliot et al 1997, Torgler and Garcia Valinas2007).

The argument for environmental taxes is that, if a product or activity is made more expensive, people will respectively buy or do less of it. If the activity is associated with excessive environmental damage, this will reduce the environmental damage. It is obviously desirable to evaluate the extent to which this argument holds up in practice, the extent to which environmental taxes really do lead to environmental improvement. Evaluations of environmental taxes following their implementation are desirable not only to see how effective they have been in environmental terms, but also to learn lessons about how best to introduce them and to communicate their impact and value to policy-makers (EEA 2009).

In Nigeria, these factors have played a very important role in policy formulation, because Nigeria is a complex country with many geographical Variations, multi ethnics, and religious diversity, for this reasons looking at these factors listed above,

 **(I ) Political trust as determinant of policy acceptance**

According to (Uslanar 2002l; Niklass2013) Asserted that people's propensity to support policy instrument is also affected by their political trust. The reason is that the more people trust the politician in the ("Parliament" and "the government"), the more likely they are to accept the policy broad up by them and environmental tax policy inclusive. This result is made comprehensible through two lines of reasoning. First, unless peoples trust in the competency of their Politician popularity i.e. the politician knows what is required to influence policy formulation which will lead to success the people will not be apt to accept the policy. Secondly, unless people trust that the political institution can and will deal with the revenues generated from the taxes in the righteous, effective, efficient and in a realistic manner by making the costs and benefits of environmental policy clearer. There will be less willing to also accept or support such tax. Furthermore, lack of accountability, trust, fairness, corruption, and participation may also affect the willingness of the public to support the policy. Unless if the public considers the

authority implementing the instrument to be trustworthy to some degree, its support for the implementation tends to be low. Public support also depends on whether the instrument will be fair in its procedures and outcome, as well as the degree to which public has had a say in the implementation process (Jagers, and Hammer 2009).

**(ii). Values Benefits and Norms as Determinant of public support and acceptance**

The values beliefs and norms theory of environmental support (Stern P.C 2000), assumes that many behavioural activities are the result of a causal chain that start with personal value priorities, which lead to beliefs i.e ( general environmental beliefs; awareness of environmental consequences; ascription of personal responsibility for these consequences) and finally the formation of personal norms of behaviour public support may likely be low if these concept  values were not taking into consideration by the policy makers.

**(iii) Interpersonal Trust as a Determinant of Public Support and Acceptance**

This factor has to do with the individual stage of a dilemma in term of decision making on environmental problems. Individual propensity to neglect cooperation in favor of adopting selfish behavior or selfish interest. This is due to the fact that most people may have a general disposition to cooperate, but this propensity is partly conditioned by their trust that the other citizens or involved actor will cooperate too. (Dowes 1980, et al Ostrom2005), individuals attitude to environmental taxes is tailored by their perception as to whether they trust in the cooperation of others. E.g First people will support environmental taxes while skeptical the likelihood that others will do likewise, i.e to act in the environmental friendly way of their own accord. One motivation for such behavior is that positive action is necessary to balance the negative effect of those acting selfishly. Second, the policy tools in itself are based on cooperation. Thus, if people instead perceive that their colleague citizens are dishonest and they doubt that people will comply with the environmental taxes they will less incline to support it (Hama H and Jaegers 2009).

## POLICY ACCEPTANCE MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION IN NIGERIA

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

**HUMAN BEHAVIOR**

MODERATOR VARIABLE

**NIGERIAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ENVIRONMENT**

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

**ACCEPTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES BY NIGERIAN TAX PAYERS**

**LEGAL ASPECTS**

The model is designed to explaining the rationale for policy implementation as claimed by Chen Bao (2010), Thalman(2012) Figure one above show the Model. The model describes the position of environmental taxes. therefore tax payers in Nigeria have to comply with the tax laws of the country (including environmental taxes laws) they are three ways the tax payers comply to environmental tax laws. Thus are as follows i. Voluntary compliance ii. Forced compliance. iii. Noncompliance. From the above models, it can be now be tested using the suitable statistical method. Therefore the variables identified in the model are dependent and independent ( i.e acceptance of environmental taxes in Nigeria by the tax payers)

**Independent variables**

**Human Behavior Aspects:** which consist of (I). Future Quality of life Thalman and Chan (2010) were of the view that the love for having a better quality in the future will encourage environmental protection. However, from their study, it has been noted artificial inducement to encourage environmental protection such as environmental taxes is redundant. Therefore environmental taxes are needed to stimulate an effort to protect the environment through behavioral changes from an individual.

(ii). Self Actualization: from chang (2010) experience concluded that the protection of the environment will be successful if the public puts the "value" of environment higher than the monetary gain. By so doing public has to be enlightened about the value of the environment. Because unless the public is willing to put the environment above the financial benefits, the introduction of any form of taxes will be successful

(iii). unless the public has a positive attitude towards the protection of the environment, any attempts to introduce any environmental protection policies will fail including environmental taxation. Therefore this variable is related to "forced compliance" if certain are forced upon, there may not be a commitment for the public to support the policy.

(iv). Tax Mitigation: Gallo (2011), that corrective fuel surcharge policy will encourage motorist to use public transport or buy more fuel efficient vehicles. This implies that the tax payer may accept a certain new environmental tax law to reduce their current tax position.

**Legal Aspect** which consists of the following: (i). forced compliance, if Nigerian taxpayer understands the motive behind environmental taxation policies and laws. He could compel or forced to accept the policies or laws because he understands why compliance is good for him. Oliver et al (2011) found that willingness of house hold to pay taxes is influenced by the level of consumers understanding of issues concerning climate change. Therefore if the public did not understand why the need to protect the environment, any attempt to introduce any environmental protection policies (environmental tax inclusive) will fail. Any compliance to the laws is because the public

is forced to comply. Fu (2010), states that the public involvement in green policy development is imperative. Any forced down policy is not acceptable.

(ii). Immediate incentives: Mewton(2010), found that public will be encouraged to accept the environmental taxes if the government will provide incentives such as tax deduction, exemption and appreciate the justification of public fund on the pollution matters. But Wilson et al (1990) asserted that the group of polluters is concentrated and well organized; while those who get from pollution control i.e the policy makers or government agencies are dispersed and unorganized. Thus the outcome is often inconsistency tax regime with exemption from the well organized group.

**Concept of Sustainable Development**

World Bank (2012), "sustainable development is about enhancing human well- being through time and society's ability to enhance or improve human well- being depends on the choices made or preference of individuals, firms, communities, and government on how to utilizes their assets"

Therefore, the ability of the nation to sustain a consumption flow (and therefore to be sustainable) depends on the change of its stock of assets or wealth. These assets may include natural assets, human assets, knowledge assets, man-made assets ex cetera. For this reasons ability to manage this asset well is very vital to achieving sustainable development. However, there limits to sustainability, particularly for environmental and social assets that enhance human well-being through their mere existence as well as indirectly through their contribution to production and material being.

**Methodology**

The population for this research work comprises of politician, individuals, and community leaders. They were chosen as a population of the research because the policy acceptance or rejection of environmental taxes will be decided by them. The target population for this study comprises of individuals who are 18 years and above.     In view of the researcher in the ability to reach out to the entire population, we adopted the

Yamane (1967) sample size calculation formulae based on the number of Samples under discussion. The sample size is derived using the statistical

Formula stated, thus:

$n = N/ (1+N (e^2))$

Where:

n= sample size

N= Population size (finite population)

e= 95 % Level of significance desired

Therefore, n = $6000/1+6000$ x $(0.05)^2$

n = 6000/15

n = 400

Using the above formulae and the total number of estimated number of 6000 people with an error limit of 5% level of significance, we arrived at a sample of 400  is, therefore, consider adequate as the Minimum for this study.

Furthermore, a well organized closed ended questionnaire was designed and administered to respondents for the analysis. The spearman Rank order Correlation which is non parametric test is used to measure the degree of association between the dependent and the independent variables in this study.

**Data Analysis and Discussion of Results**



**Analysis of Policy Acceptance and Individual Perception**

- policy acceptance
- individuals perception

**SOURCE: Researcher computation 2015**

From the above line chart, the following can be deduced. Out of the 400 copies of a questionnaire administered, only 350 copies were retrieved with 50 copies not properly filled. Therefore, a total of 300 copies representing 75 percent were used for this analysis. 74 respondents and 94 representing 56 percent of the respondents are of the view that the policy is either bad or very bad policy that policy acceptance of environmental taxes is very weak. Nevertheless, regardless of this presentation by the respondents on the above subject matter, neither 60 respondents which represent 20 percent remain undecided that is they choose neither good nor bad policy another 54 respondents which represent 18 percent are of the view that the policy is good. But it is valid to conclude that their policy acceptance of environmental taxes is weak. Furthermore, on the same line, char two is representing the analysis of the respondent responses on why do individuals perceptions on environmental taxes is assertive? Out of the 300 respondents 40 respondents and 70 representing 23.3 percent of the total respondents, are of the view that the policy is either bad or very bad which concur with the assertion in the policy acceptance model on the behavior of an individual, where as 80 respondents which represent 26.7 percent remain

undecided that is they choose neither good nor bad policy. Another 110 respondents which represent 36.7 percent are of the view that the policy is good.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

On the basis of the results obtained it has been observed that governmental trustworthiness effects peoples support and acceptance of the new taxes towards and compliance with the public policy in general. It has also been demonstrated that trust has seriously affected people's attitude to environmental taxes. It has been noted that peoples tend to be more supportive of environmental tax if the trust their co- citizens, i.e if they believe that other will pay their share. Hence it may be a good idea, at least if trust is generally low, to implement only those taxes that are hard to evade. People tend to be more supportive of it and higher taxes- if they trust their politicians for the following two reasons.

i. To be supportive of environmental taxes, people must trust the politician will use the tax revenue in a transparent and well judicious manner.

ii. The tax public believes that the politicians are convinced that the tax will have its intended effect and it is considered sound policy choice.

Furthermore, government should come up with regulatory discipline by designing a tax that may coordinate environment and tax policies and programmes with the necessary political will aim at reducing pollution, and also the tax policy may be designed to place the tax burden heavily on those responsible for the particular environmental problem.

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